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Abstract
The St. Louis Public Schools of St. Louis, Missouri were at one time the second
largest segregated school district in the United States. In the years since Brown v. Board
of Education ruling in 1954 and 1955, the school district of St. Louis has been attempting
to desegregate as ordered by the courts. A group of North Side parents brought a lawsuit
against the district and the State of Missouri that, after many years of litigation, found
both parties to be liable for maintaining segregated schools, but an out-of-court
settlement was reached. As a result of this suit and subsequent decisions, the 1975
Consent Decree, 1980 Intracity Settlement Agreement, and 1983 Interdistrict Settlement
Agreement provided African American children in the city of St. Louis several new
options for schooling that included both busing to majority white districts in St. Louis
County and magnet schools within the city school district.
The focus of this study is the magnet school system that was created as an
outcome of the litigation and the two-tiered school district it subsequently created over
the last forty years. Magnet schools, also known as selective enrollment schools, are
provided extra resources, staff members, and location in desirable neighborhoods
whereas comprehensive schools, also known as neighborhood or open enrollment
schools, are not provided these extra resources yet enroll large numbers of African
American children. It will be argued that this lasting legacy of Brown is inherently unjust
and unequal and in fact contributes to the systemic racism experienced by people of color
in the city of St. Louis.
Throughout this dissertation, the terms African American and Black will be used
interchangeably.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Public schools in the United States have an important function to educate students
to become productive citizens, yet there are no federal laws outlining how schools should
be organized or established, as supported by the 10th Amendment to the United States
Constitution. States and local school boards throughout the U.S. have that responsibility
as the framers of the Constitution intended with the division of federal and state powers.
Specifically, the Missouri Legislature established free schools across the state in 1845.
However, students of color in Missouri have not been given the same opportunity for, or
access to, education as their white peers, as evidenced in 1847 when the Missouri
Legislature barred African American students from learning to read, write or even
assemble in public. 1 This prevailing mentality about the rights of African Americans was
due to its admittance to the Union as a slave state, as part of the Missouri Compromise.
In 1875, revisions to the Missouri Constitution included a provision for the establishment
of racially separate schools for children.2
Due to Missouri’s location along the Mason-Dixon Line and its status as a border
state, the population of African American school-aged children continued to rise through
the 1800s. As a result, African American adults used any means necessary to educate
their children, going to great lengths, including instituting schools on riverboats, to
ensure their next generation could read, write and participate in society as an educated
equal to white people.3 By 1875, these efforts combined with the continued influx of

Justin D Smith, “Hostile Takeover: The State of Missouri, the St. Louis School District, and the Struggle for Quality
Education in the Inner City,” Missouri Law Review, 74, no 4. (2009): 1143-1169.
2
Kimberly Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Forty-Year Quest for Quality Public Education Remains a Dream Deferred,”
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy, 40, no. 1 (2012): 1-65.
3
Smith, “Hostile Takeover.”
1
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African Americans to Missouri led to the creation of the first African American High
School west of the Mississippi, located in St. Louis city. Sumner High School served as
a magnet for Black families across the state and region because nowhere else could their
children have access to this level of education.4 Non-city residents who sent their
children to Sumner High School had to pay $100 tuition to the district.5 This caused
many African American families to move into the city to gain access to the school system
within the city limits.
The struggle of African Americans to gain access to education was significantly
aided by the passage of Plessy v. Ferguson in 1896.6 Legally, the district, city and state
had to provide separate but equal public spaces, including schools. This ruling gave
African Americans a legal method to push the local school board and the state to provide
schools for their children, which was critical given the rising African American
population in St. Louis City and the surrounding county areas. African American
students living in the county surrounding St. Louis city were able to attend Sumner High
School among other St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS) schools serving African American
families.7 Although the Black and white schools were definitively not equal, African
American students still had better outcomes and access to education than in years prior to
the passage of Plessy.
History of Court Decisions
The Board of Education operating in the city of St. Louis, Missouri, maintained
separate schools for many years until the Brown v. Topeka Board of Education ruling in
Melanie Adams, “Advocating for Educational Equity: African American Citizens’ Councils in St. Louis, Missouri,
from 1864 to 1927,” (PhD diss., University of Missouri – St. Louis, 2014).
5
Lynn Beckwith, Personal communication, June 23, 2016.
6
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
7
Adams, “Advocating for Educational Equity.”
4
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two parts, first in 1954 and in a follow-up decision in 1955, forced a district remedy for
the integration of all public schools.8 At the time of the Brown decision, the St. Louis
School Board was operating the second-largest segregated public school system in the
country, ranked behind the Baltimore Public Schools of Maryland. 9 The St. Louis Public
School district slowly integrated its schools, and, in a series of decisions between 1972
and 1983, the district was held liable for not desegregating with all deliberate speed and
for using the neighborhood school concept to perpetuate segregation in the school
system. In the later decisions, the State of Missouri was also named a constitutional
violator alongside the SLPS district.
Proposed remedies to abolish the segregated system in SLPS included redrawing
neighborhood boundary lines and integrating the technical school program. However,
none of these policies were effective at integrating the schools, ultimately just shifting
from de jure to de facto segregation, and these policies were seen to actually worsen
segregation within the city of St. Louis.10 Since the 1948 Shelley v. Kraemer decision
about redlining and unconstitutional practices in mortgage lending and insurance of
homes, the city of St. Louis and surrounding counties were undergoing immense and
swift demographic changes.11
Magnet schools first appeared in St. Louis after 1976 as part of a consent decree
between the defendant, the St. Louis Public Schools Board of Education, and plaintiffs,

8

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Gerald Heaney and Susan Uchitelle, Unending Struggle: The Long Road to an Equal Education in St. Louis (St.
Louis, MO: Reedy Press, 2004); Smith, “Hostile Takeover.”
10
Smith, “Hostile Takeover”; Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
11
Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Colin Gordon, Mapping Decline: St. Louis and the Fate of the American City,
(Philadelphia: Univ of Penn Press, 2009); Jeffrey Copeland, Olivia’s Story: The Conspiracy of Heroes
behind Shelley v. Kraemer, (St. Paul: Paragon House, 2010); Jeffrey D. Gonda, Unjust Deeds: The Restrict
Covenant Cases and the Making of the Civil Rights Movement, (Chappell Hill, UNC Press, 2015).
9
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African American families and children living in St. Louis, including Minnie Liddell. 12
She served as the Lead Plaintiff who spearheaded the charge in bringing this suit to court
in cooperation with other African American adults and the Concerned Parents of North
St. Louis.13 Mrs. Liddell knew concretely, through firsthand experience with her own
five children, the stark differences that existed between Black and white schools in the
segregated school district of St. Louis. She fervently wanted her children to have access
to a high-quality education that she knew was offered and available to white children.
Her oldest son, Craton Liddell, was subjected to block busing due to overcrowding at his
neighborhood school, Yeatman Elementary School. Block busing took students who
were geographically assigned to one school and sent them elsewhere. Yeatman
Elementary School was newly constructed and Ms. Liddell was upset that despite living
in the attendance area for this new school, Craton was instead bused to a different school
that was not new.
Every morning Craton walked down the street to board a bus with his class and
teacher at an all-Black school close to his house in North St. Louis. In intact or ‘block’
busing, African American students were bused to formerly all-Black schools that were in
horrible states of disrepair for the purposes of reducing overcrowded schools in North St.
Louis.14 In other examples, Black students from the north side were driven to an allwhite school in a south St. Louis white neighborhood. These classes of children had to
enter through the back doors of the white schools, experienced separate recess and lunch
periods, had specific times when they could use the water fountains, and were never

Smith, “Hostile Takeover.” Liddell v. St. Louis Board of Education, 72C 100(1). Consent Judgment and Decree.
U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Missouri (1975).
13
Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle; Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
14
Smith, “Hostile Takeover”; Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
12
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integrated with the white students or faculty. In the early 1960s, almost 5,000 African
American students were subjected to this policy. 15
Initially, nine magnet elementary schools and two magnet high schools were
created in SLPS as part of the Consent Decree in the Liddell suit, but they were not
serving a substantial number of African American children.16 By the 1978-79 school
year, there were three secondary magnet schools, yet many African American students
were not able to attend, and segregation continued to worsen in the city school system as
white flight dramatically changed the demographic landscape of the city and region in
that time period.17
The initial court-mandated remedies in the Liddell suit were continuously found
to be insufficient by the courts, resulting in the 1980 Intracity Desegregation Plan. This
led to another round of appeals with another out-of-court Settlement in 1983: the first
voluntary desegregation settlement reached in the United States.18 This agreement came
on the eve of a pending decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on
the status of the most recent appeal to Liddell from the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Missouri.
The 1983 Interdistrict Settlement Agreement was a voluntary desegregation plan
that was adopted by the St. Louis school district and 23 surrounding St. Louis County
districts that outlined four major steps towards desegregating the SLPS: creation of a
system for voluntary transfers of African American children in the city to participating
county districts, the creation of a robust magnet school program in SLPS designed to
15

Amy Stuart Wells and Robert L. Crain, Stepping Over the Color Line: African American Students in White
Suburban Schools (United States of America: Yale University Press, 1997).
16
Joan Little, “Magnets’ Supply, Demand Unequal; City Whites and Blacks Face Shortage of Seats,” St. Louis Post
Dispatch, January 22, 1995.
17
Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle.
18
Smith, “Hostile Takeover.”
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attract white students from county districts to attend, funding for capital improvements to
SLPS schools and lastly, and most significant to this study, a guarantee of quality
education to those African American students left in highly segregated schools.19
Mandatory desegregation programs contributed more significantly than voluntary
plans to white flight.20 The 1983 Interdistrict Settlement Agreement discontinued
mandatory busing within the city district and included several voluntary methods for
integration. The voluntary busing plank of the desegregation plan was widely touted to
be the most effective part of the plan, giving African American city students an
opportunity to attend more racially balanced and higher performing schools in St. Louis
County, albeit with the burden of a long bus ride.21 In 1994, 13,500 African American
students participated in the voluntary transfer program, leaving the city each morning for
schools in St. Louis County.22 By 1995, 40.6% of the African American students left in
SLPS—those not participating in the inter-district transfer program—attended nonintegrated schools. 23
Magnet Schools as a Remedy to Segregation
Magnet schools have been a part of many desegregation plans across the United
States since Brown v. Board required public schools to integrate.24 Federal financial
support for magnet schools was available in the form of the Magnet Schools Assistance

Bruce La Pierre, “Voluntary Interdistrict School Desegregation in St. Louis: The Special Master’s Tale,” Wisconsin
Law Review no. 971 (1987); Smith, “Hostile Takeover”; Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest”; Cedric Powell,
“From Louisville to Liddell: Schools, Rhetorical Neutrality and the Post-Racial Equal Protection Clause,”
Washington University Journal of Law and Policy 40, (2012): 153.
20
David Armor, Forced Justice: School Desegregation and the Law, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
21
Powell, “From Louisville to Liddell.”
22
Joan Little and Cynthia Todd, “Discrimination in City Schools Lives On; But Basis is Magnet Schools, Not Race,”
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, February 20, 1994.
23
Smith, “Hostile Takeover.”
24
Ellen Goldring and Claire Smrekar, “Magnet Schools: Reform and Race in Urban Education,” The Clearing House:
A Journal of Educational Strategies, Issues and Ideas, 76, 1 (2002): 13-15.
19

11

Another 40 years of Inequity: Two-Tier Schooling as the Lasting Legacy of
Desegregation in St. Louis, Missouri
Program (MSAP). The MSAP provided resources in court-ordered or voluntary
desegregation programs that created and maintained magnet schools. Magnet schools are
a common option in desegregation plans, and in 1991, 30% of districts in the U.S. had
desegregation plans that included magnet schools.25 Specifically in the St. Louis
settlement, both the State government and the State Board of Education were required to
fund the large majority of the desegregation agreement.26 Over the time period from
1983-1994, over $1 billion in state monies was spent by the SLPS to implement all parts
of the desegregation plan.27 Unfortunately, with this influx of money, financial resources
stratified schools within the district, and a deep divide began separating students in
magnet schools from those in traditional, comprehensive (neighborhood) schools.
Specifically, the per-pupil cost was more than $9000 for magnet school students and
under $7000 for students in neighborhood non-magnet schools.28
The goal of widespread desegregation in the SLPS through the use of magnet
schools was largely unrealized in the early years after the 1983 Settlement Agreement,
and there were several follow-up court interventions in the 1980s led by the Magnet
School Review committee. This entity forced the district to open more magnet schools in
an effort to provide more seats and further incentivize white students to return to the city
school programs.29 More African American students were using the voluntary busing
option than the magnet school system, and hardly any white students were coming into
the city from the county to attend the magnet schools. 30 Desegregation was not occurring

25

Armor, Forced Justice.
La Pierre, “Special Master’s Tale.”
27
Little and Todd, “Discrimination in City Schools.”
28
Christian Science Monitor, “St. Louis Schools: Have-Nots vs. Have-Lots, Magnet Schools, created to aid integration,
are criticized for the limited access they provide blacks, the majority of the city’s students.” May 23, 1994.
29
Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle.
30
Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
26
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to the extent expected by the Judge presiding over the Settlement Agreement. In August
of 1988, presiding Judge Limbaugh ordered seven new magnets to be created that had
affiliations with local cultural, educational, or business institutions.31 Growth in magnet
school enrollment was seen in the years following, with the population of students in the
magnet schools going from 8000 in 1987 to 12,000 registered to attend in 1993.32 This
increase was partially due to the addition of three new magnet schools in the fall of
1993.33
In 1991, Missouri Attorney General William Webster brought a suit petitioning
the court for unitary status for SLPS in an effort to relieve the State of financial
responsibility in desegregating the schools.34 Unitary status is the legal term used to
show that a district had done everything it could to desegregate and that any remaining
racial imbalance was the result of choice, not policy, thereby releasing the entity in
question from any further legal requirements. 35 There were several consent decrees
across the United States in the mid-1990s, but the biggest blow to state intervention and
remedy for school segregation came when the U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1995 in
Jenkins v. State of Missouri that there was no justification for an inter-district remedy for
an intra-district segregation problem.36 This decision followed an increasing number of
court decisions across the nation that were shifting power to a process approach and away
from the substantive equality approach of the past.37

Virginia Hick, “Building Considered for Magnet School,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 26, 1989.
Joan Little, “Enrollment Up at St. Louis Magnet Schools; Three New Schools Lead to 25% Increase,” St. Louis Post
Dispatch, August 26, 1993.
33
Joan Little, “Judge Orders City to Buy Site for School; Court Wants Institution Close to Science Center,” St. Louis
Post Dispatch, July 8, 1993.
34
Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle; Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
35
Wells and Crain, Stepping Over.
36
Jenkins v. State of Missouri (Jenkins III), 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Heaney and Uchitelle, Unending Struggle.
37
Powell, “From Louisville to Liddell.”
31
32
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In 1999, a settlement was finally reached that transitioned the Missouri
Legislature and SLPS Board of Education away from legal responsibility and financial
obligation for maintaining a legally enforceable desegregation plan while giving back
local control of any desegregation efforts over the following ten years.38 This decision
indicated that unitary status had been achieved, and the transition to local control began
even though 18,000 students in the SLPS attended non-integrated schools.39 The state
included a provision in the settlement agreement that postponed an accreditation
determination of SLPS to allow the city school system time to rectify deficiencies.40
Magnet schools were continuously added to the SLPS system in an effort to
attract more white students to the city schools and reverse declining enrollment, but these
efforts were largely unsuccessful at doing so in significant numbers. 41
Problem Statement
It is the belief of this author that the desegregation settlement put forth in response
to the Liddell suit continues to be completely unacceptable and insufficient at resolving
the lasting issue of segregation in the SLPS and proving this statement is the goal of this
dissertation. Although the Interdistrict Settlement Agreement has been in existence since
1983, the SLPS system even in 2016 includes segregated schools in two tiers, magnet and
comprehensive, which are both entirely separate and unequal as continually made evident
by school accreditation status. While there exists no fully accredited comprehensive high
schools, almost all the magnet schools are fully accredited with some even achieving
accredited with distinction status. This study illuminates the grossly inequitable, tiered

Smith, “Hostile Takeover.”
Ibid.
40
Norwood, “Minnie Liddell’s Quest.”
41
La Pierre, “Special Master’s Tale.”
38
39
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system that currently exists in SLPS between these two school types. In the final chapter,
a proposal is set forth to attempt to abolish this tiered system.
Theoretical Frame
Due to the nature of this study, two theoretical frames are employed to help tell
the history of the desegregation litigation in the St. Louis Public Schools. Specifically,
Critical Race Theory (CRT) empowers me as the author to contest the oppressive power
structures in a culture.42 Since this study focuses on the years 1954 to the present,
historical analysis is also employed. Specifically, a frame of historical revisionism is
used since the events, dates, costs and numerical outcomes of the various desegregation
plans are known and have been recorded across many different sources. However, from
what perspectives were these events recorded in local and national history? Has the story
of the St. Louis schools desegregation been told accurately from the perspective of those
on the margins, or have those with privilege in the dominant group told this story? I
argue for a new interpretation of the desegregation litigation and tell this revised story
using CRT.
The SLPS system’s structure of power serves to benefit the majority race, and the
different desegregation plans were one major part of this system. Because this study is an
examination of power structures and who benefits from policy, critical race theory is
applicable to this system. Gall, Gall and Borg state, “CRT is…a new analytic rubric for
considering difference and inequity using multiple methodologies and displacement of
taken-for-granted norms around unequal binaries.”43 One such binary is the tiered system

42

Meredith D. Gall, Joyce P. Gall, Walter R. Borg, Educational Research, An Introduction, Eighth Edition, (New
York: Pearson Publishing, 2007).
43
Ibid, 516.
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of schooling that exists in SLPS, that of the magnet and comprehensive schools, which is
the primary focus of this study. Merriam explains that the crux of critical research is
power dynamics, which is exactly where I centered my analysis of the two-tiered school
system in SLPS.44 For the St. Louis desegregation story, questions include who had
power and access to high quality schools and who was in charge of maintaining and
disseminating that power within and across schools and to children of different races?
Merriam goes on to ask, “whose interests are being served by the way the educational
system is organized, who really has access to particular programs”?45 Answering that
question is the focus of critical studies in education, which is why CRT is an appropriate
frame to use in this study.
I would further argue that a rewriting of the three different Court plans’ impact on
children and families of color and its legacy to the city of St. Louis is absolutely
necessary given its lasting and continuing harm on children in the city. Historical
revisionists make “critiques of existing histories by subjecting them to new and
sometimes politically radical interpretive frameworks.”46 Retelling the history of the
desegregation in St. Louis is necessary in order to demonstrate the lack of equity that still
exists today in the SLPS. Gall, Gall and Borg further state, “researchers in the criticaltheory research tradition seek to apply a critical orientation toward educational practice
that generates historical explanations for controversial or unjust educational practices that
greatly differ from conventional, mainstream interpretations.”47 Public opinion of the
magnet schools lauds them as successful schools supposedly granting access to high-
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quality education for the students attending them. However, little attention is paid to the
quality of schools in the other portion of the system, that of the neighborhood, nonmagnet, comprehensive schools. There is little public discourse regarding the fairness of
this unjust, two-tiered system that has relegated thousands of students to sub-par
educational institutions since its creation in the early 1970s.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to critically analyze the Consent Decree of 1975, the
1980 Intracity Settlement Agreement, and the 1983 St. Louis Interdistrict Settlement
Agreement of St. Louis, Missouri using the theoretical frames of Critical Race Theory
and historical revisionism. Since one tenet of CRT is ending oppression, an alternative
model to the current binary system of schools that exists in SLPS is proposed in the final
chapter. By learning about the impacts of the actors, relationships, environments and
structures, and processes, a deeper understanding of magnet school policy can be
developed. 48
Significance of the Study
When a problem is observed in society, is it not our responsibility as citizens to
try to remedy that problem? Such is the quandary I see within the SLPS in its tiered
system of education. I have worked in both magnet and comprehensive schools in my
eleven-year tenure with SLPS and have seen firsthand the stark, lingering inequality that
exists between the two school types. As my own race consciousness and awareness of
my own “white privilege” have risen through critical scholarship and higher education, I
realize the supreme importance of naming the racism and white supremacy that I observe
48
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around me every day. 49 This dissertation is a way of witnessing racism and the impact of
white supremacy in policy to a larger audience. CRT states that we must take radical
steps to abolish racism and posits that a critique of existing liberal policy is necessary to
move in a new direction towards equality. That is what I attempt to do with this study.
This study contributes to scholarly research in the field of CRT as it is applied to
educational policy by exposing the tiered system of schools and the racist structures that
contribute to the continued oppression of African American children in the city of St.
Louis. Existing critiques of desegregation programs focus on inter/intra district busing
policies, voluntary versus involuntary programs, and their impact on the racial balance in
schools. CRT has not been used to aid in the critique of a desegregation plan involving
magnet schools, which, as mentioned previously, were a component of most
desegregation plans nationwide. While busing has faded out of popular policy and
eventually dropped from legal mandates, magnet schools continue to exist and still have
widespread support across the country. The widespread use of magnet schools is
extremely problematic to consider and why this study is critically important and a
necessary contribution to the literature.
Ideally, this study seeks to improve public school policy by exposing the injustice
that has occurred over time in one large metropolitan school district in the United States
of America. Applying CRT to the St. Louis desegregation decisions and agreements
intensifies the impact of the critique being made against this policy and generates
scholarly impetuous for radical change. We cannot be a country that calls itself the land
of opportunity when so many of our non-white children are not given the same chance at
life through a lack of access to high quality schools. The widespread use of magnet
49
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schools, which contributes to tiered school systems across the country, is a lasting legacy
of the aftermath of the Brown v. Board of Education decision that we can no longer
tolerate and accept for our children of color.
Delimitations
This study is limited to the time period from the first Brown v. Board decision in
1954 to the present day in the city of St. Louis, Missouri. The primary focus of the study
is on the actions of the SLPS in the years following the adoption of the 1975 Consent
Decree, specifically the creation of both magnet and comprehensive schools. The quality
of these schools were analyzed used the methods designed by the Missouri State School
Board under the Missouri School Improvement Program (MSIP) V. The main tool of
analysis was public records of the SLPS Board of Education, legal documents associated
with the litigation of Liddell, and local print media accounts of both the magnet and
comprehensive schools.
Definitions
Allied Participant Observer: As a professional in education who works directly in the
SLPS schools and observes the magnet school process, this is my formal research
perspective and location.
Comprehensive (also neighborhood) school: A school that draws students from a
specific geographic area surrounding it with no admissions requirements.
Consent Decree: The first court decision regarding Liddell, came in December of 1975.
It set up the first system of magnet schools in SLPS.
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Critical Race Theory (CRT): A branch of Critical Legal Studies developed initially by
Ladson-Billings and Tate that has emerged as a tool for critique of educational
inequalities that exist in society. 50
Historical Revisionism: The process of retelling history juxtaposed with a dominant
story that has been accepted as fact.
Intracity Settlement Agreement: A 1980 plan established upon a Court of Appeals
ruling that overturned Judge Meredith’s initial decision on the challenge to the 1975
Consent Decree. It found the SLPS and State of Missouri violated the constitution by
maintaining a segregated school system.
Interest Convergence: Derrick Bell stated that Blacks only gain racial equality when it
converges with the interest of whites.51
Magnet school: A school with a specific curricular focus that employs selective
enrollment criteria for the admission of students.
Quota: A ratio of two things, in this study primarily a ratio of Black to white students
Racial Realism: An idea of legal scholar Derrick Bell that states racism is persistent and
permanent in society.
Racism: A matrix of systemic and structural conventions and customs that uphold and
sustain oppressive group relationship based in race that has been found to limit status,
income, and educational attainment.52
St. Louis Public Schools (SLPS): The public school district in the city of St. Louis
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St. Louis Voluntary Interdistrict Desegregation Settlement Agreement: As a result
of the Liddell suit, this agreement was put forth in 1983 involving 23 school districts, the
state of Missouri and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
Selective Enrollment: The ability of a school to choose which students will attend
annually and to reject students that do not meet specific admissions criteria.
Unitary Status: When a deciding court at the federal level finds a school district to have
supported a sufficient amount of desegregation such that oversight by the court is no
longer necessary.
White Supremacy: Mills asserts that White Supremacy is the unnamed global political
system that has profoundly shaped the modern world. It is a system of privilege that is
passed to white people without their consent or agreement and very rarely awareness of
said privilege.53
Summary
The St. Louis Public School District was taken to court by a group of parents,
including Minnie Liddell, beginning in 1972 and this case is still litigated in the present
day. The Court found that SLPS violated the constitution by maintaining a segregated
school system and the district held fiscally responsible by the U.S. District Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, along with 23 other school districts and the state of
Missouri. These districts entered into a voluntary settlement as an alternative to the
pending decision by the Eighth Circuit Court to create one large metropolitan school
district. The voluntary settlement allowed them to have ownership over the
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desegregation plan and its implementation, rather than being forced into a metro-wide
merger of all the named school districts.
One consistent piece of the three different desegregation plans put forth by the
court was the creation of magnet schools: schools offering specialized academic
programs that would serve as integrated schools in the district. Unfortunately, these
schools only further perpetuated inequality within the district as they formed one half of a
tiered system of schools that gave more money and resources to the magnet schools and
left the comprehensive schools to physically deteriorate and decline in achievement.
Chapter Two of this study highlights the literature around this topic, looking at
other desegregation plans nationwide and highlighting several studies that have offered
critiques of these plans. It also highlights the relevant literature within CRT and justifies
why it is an appropriate theoretical frame to use in this study. Additionally, Chapter Two
explains historical revisionism in the literature, why it is also appropriate for use in this
study and other examples of its inclusion in educational policy scholarship.
Chapter Three illuminates the research design and methodology of this study,
including a personal explanation of my position as an allied participant observer and my
journey to becoming a scholar of critical race theory. Chapter Four discusses my
findings in the historical documents analyzed, demonstrating how white supremacy has
shaped the St. Louis desegregation litigation since its inception in 1972 while giving the
reader information about the judges that presided over the case throughout its history and
the main committees that were tasked with proposing and executing the desegregation
orders. Chapter Five highlights the counter story about the desegregation orders,
highlighting how policy was not pro-African American and not wholly beneficial for the
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plaintiffs of the suit. Chapter Six focuses specifically on the non-integrated schools
(NIS) and the different programs that were implemented in an effort to increase their
quality while also highlighting how ineffective they actually were. Chapter Seven tackles
some of the ways white supremacy impacted policy both at the state and local level. This
chapter also discusses several glaring examples of how interest convergence played a
major role in shaping policy that was exclusively ordered as supportive to African
Americans, not whites. Lastly, Chapter Eight presents conclusions of the study and
proposes a new and radical educational policy that offers an alternative model to the
current tiered system of education in the St. Louis Public Schools.
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
Introduction
Several themes and topics relevant to this study are reviewed in this chapter,
including historical revisionism, Critical Race Theory, whiteness positioning, and
critiques of desegregation and magnet school policies in the U.S.
Historical Revisionism
Educational history is a broad field that has many subfields and nuances. A
question that can be posed is: From whose perspective has the educational history been
written and for whose benefit are the events recorded? Educational researchers must
examine policies and analyze how these issues have shaped the inequality in the
educational systems around the nation over time. One of those issues is racial inequality
in school systems. Reese and Rury state, “revisionist scholars argued that the schools
reinforced existing patterns of discrimination and inequality”. 54
The field of historical revisionism in education came about in the 1960s and
1970s with examinations of colonial education in the publication of Bernard Bailyn’s
essay, Education in the Forming of American Society.55 This essay was a first attempt at
telling a new and different story about the history of education in the U.S. Bailyn
launched a new field in education, one that garnered much support and interest. 56 Given
the turbulence across the United States during the 1960s and 1970s, it is no surprise that
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these young revisionists were making waves and exposing the lie of schools as the great
equalizer in society, serving the interests of all students, regardless of race. Now that a
new field was developing, scholars, including Bailyn, Cremin, Katz, Spring, Kaestle and
Schultz among others, adamantly took up the cause and began telling the story of
educational history in new ways. 57 The revisionist perspective is one I wrote from in this
study, as “revisionist themes of injustice and exploitation remain[ed] important in this
broad body of work.”58 The revisionist style of writing history from a different
perspective attempts to liberate oppressed people by highlighting their oppression and
situating it within the larger progression of time. As stated by Gaddis, “the sources of
oppression are lodged in time and are not independent of that time…which makes its
[history’s] liberating effects all the more powerful”.59 In this statement, Gaddis gives the
educational historian important justification for the importance of using history in a
liberating way.
Educational Policy Critique
Educational policy analysis is an extremely complex task, as many considerations
must be made in thinking about what generated the policy, how it was implemented, what
factors contributed to its creation, and how it is funded. Weaver-Hightower provides a
poignant and purposeful way to consider policy, one that draws on the concept of ecology
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to provide a framework for analysis. 60 Ecology is the study of how organisms interact
with and in their environment, considering both biotic and abiotic factors. WeaverHightower situates this concept in policy analysis and expands it further in stating, “a
policy ecology consists of the policy itself along with all of the texts, histories, people,
places, groups, traditions, economic and political conditions, institutions, and
relationships that affect it or that it affects.”61
Policy ecology consists of four major categories: actors, relationships,
environments, and structures.62 The various parts of St. Louis desegregation efforts are
examined through these four categories in an attempt to highlight the complexities within
this policy in a strategic and organized way. This method is precisely what is necessary
for this study as Weaver-Hightower explains, “a policy ecology metaphor creates … new
progressive potentials and effective means for critiquing policies that serve the interested
of only the few and for creating the kind of policy that makes a difference for educators
and their students.”63 It is the hope of creating new potential policy that draws me to this
framework, since I argue that magnet schools in St. Louis serve to benefit only a few, not
the majority, of students in the city.
Critical Race Theory Overview
The field of Critical Race Theory (CRT) is an offshoot of Critical Legal Studies
(CLS), and its application to the field of education can be primarily traced to a paper
coauthored by Gloria Landson-Billings and William Tate in 1995.64 CLS was not
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equipped to provide strategies for societal transformation: the impetus for CRT. Taylor
asserts that CRT “holds the promise to inform educational strategies and renew efforts of
resistance,” which is why is it appropriate to apply in this study. 65 CRT provides a set of
operating paradigms that allows educational researchers to talk about topics like race, the
permanence of racism, white supremacy, and white privilege in scholarly ways. 66
The first claim of CRT that legal scholars Derrick Bell and Richard Delgado have
prominently and repeatedly stated is that racism is permanent, normalized, and a major
influence in United States society.67 Employing the primary strategy outlined by CRT,
this study first highlights how racism is a major part of the St. Louis desegregation
litigation. Bell has a very pessimistic, albeit realistic, view of the permanence of racism
outlined in his piece, Racial Realism.68 Bell states, “In spite of dramatic civil rights
movements and periodic victories in the legislatures, Black Americans by no means are
equal to whites. Racial equality, is, in fact, not a realistic goal.”69 While he
acknowledges that this viewpoint is not be popular, he contends that because the courts
have made little to no progress successfully eliminating the vestiges of racism, people of
color must accept it in an effort to move forward with different strategies to become
equal. 70 This harsh reality is experienced over multiple generations in families of color
and is unfortunately the first place any Critical Race scholar must start from in order to
justify the work she must do and situate it within the scholarship.
65
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Kimberle Crenshaw furthers the discussion of oppression by including class,
gender, and sexuality, in addition to many others, as categories by which people on the
margins are oppressed.71 She states “through an awareness of intersectionality, we can
better acknowledge and ground the differences among us and negotiate the means by
which these differences will find expression in constructing group politics.”72 This study
touches on class oppression, but mainly focuses on race since that was the primary focus
of the various St. Louis Desegregation decrees, settlements and court orders. That focus
is not to discount all other forms of oppression but rather to shine the spotlight on a single
oppression that people on the margins experience through their interaction with the St.
Louis Public Schools (SLPS).
The second claim of CRT is that storytelling is the preferred method to expose
racism because it honors the perspective of the oppressed individual. 73 These stories are
what explain the racism that surrounds and envelops people of color every day of their
existence and helps highlight the abuses they experience at the hands of the oppressor.
These stories are crucial to the process of combatting racism by bringing it forth into
public discourse through narration and the sharing of personal experience with racism.
Delgado explains this concept further by providing three reasons why storytelling is
crucial in the field of CRT. He states,
1. Much of reality is socially constructed, 2. Stories provide members of
outgroups a vehicle for psychic self-preservation and 3. The exchange of stories
from teller to listener can help overcome ethnocentrism and the dysconscious
conviction of viewing the world in one way. 74
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By bringing forward the experiences of those people relegated to the margins of society,
their experience is given value and can be used to expose the racist trappings of society.
Their experience as oppressed must be heard in order to move forward with new policy
and continue the fight towards a more just system of education.
The third claim of CRT is that liberalism demands a critique for its role in
attempting to combat racism, since it has shown no ability to abolish racism through
incremental change.75 Americans have witnessed the slow and ineffective progress of
liberalism in educational policy since the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision and
the enforcement of myriad desegregation policies around the country in the years after
that fateful decision. Unfortunately, the law has not been favorable to people of color,
and CRT argues that new methods are essential to achieve the drastic and dramatic
changes necessary for equality for all people. Zamudio, Russell, Rios, Bridgeman state,
“liberal education reforms fail to address the basic problems that underlie the marginal
education that students of color routinely receive.”76 It is time for a new direction; CRT
provides a path on which to forge ahead.
Continuing in this strand of thought is the fourth claim of CRT, that the main
benefactors of civil rights legislation have been white people.77 Derrick Bell pioneered
the term “interest-convergence” to explain the discrepancy in who the benefactors of
liberal policy have been, and he has written extensively on this subject.78 Bell uses the
case of Brown v. Board of Education to expose the benefit to white Americans of this
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decision. Specifically, Bell states, “the decision helped to provide immediate credibility
to America’s struggle with communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging
third world people.”79 United States politicians around the world had mud on their faces
because of the atrocities occurring on the home front, causing them to lose leverage and
political power against Communism. Brown gave politicians a way to save face and
show something was being done against segregation. Bell goes on to explain,
“segregation was viewed as a barrier to further industrialization in the South,” again
showing how the ruling of Brown was a moment of interest convergence for white
people. 80
Mary J. Dudziak furthers this idea by expanding on why the United States was
forced to act on segregation in the face of the Cold War. 81 She states, “the international
focus on U.S. racial problems meant that the image of American democracy was
tarnished”. 82 The United States legislative branch was in a difficult position, forced to
endorse concrete legal proceedings to eliminate segregation back home in order to fight
communism abroad.83 News stories of the unfair treatment of African Americans were
making international press and made the United States look like a hypocrite in its fight
against Communism.
Choosing CRT as the frame of analysis for this study is an intentional one due to
the liberating nature of this work. Gloria Ladson-Billings states, “adopting and adapting
CRT as framework for educational equity means that we will have to expose racism in
education and propose radical solutions for addressing it…we will have to take bold and
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sometimes unpopular positions.”84 Educational scholars who use CRT are accepting the
charge to first name the injustice they see in school systems in the U.S. Then, we must
come up with new ways to combat the injustice we’ve exposed. Naming the injustice
victims of racism experience is one way in which the victims can be heard.85 Bell
furthers this claim by stating, “most critical race theorists are committed to a program of
scholarly resistance and most hope scholarly resistance will lay the groundwork for widescale resistance”.86 The challenge posed by CRT is not to be accepted lightly, but in this
study, I am extremely frank, as unpopular as it may be.
Whiteness and White Supremacy
The position of white educators and scholars has been taken up in the literature
and it is worth reviewing for this study. Zeus Leonardo explains, “a critical pedagogy of
white racial supremacy revolves less around the issue of unearned advantages, or the
state of being dominant, and more around direct processes that secure domination and the
privileges associated with it.”87 White people across all classes are given significant
advantages in society due to their race and are able to walk through life without
knowledge of being white. Their experience is completely opposite the experience of
people of color who are constantly reminded of their race in daily interactions that yield
microaggressions and other negative outcomes. Leonardo goes on to state, “although
they [white people] clearly benefit from racism in different ways, whites as a racial group
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secure supremacy in almost all facets of social life.”88 Educational institutions and
schools are one major place where this idea becomes elucidated.
The acts of white supremacy in schools systems have been intentionally hidden,
which is what helps maintain the inherent power structures for white students and
families. Leonardo describes this process: “set up a system that benefits the group
[whites], mystify the system, remove the agents of actions from discourse, and when
interrogated about it, stifle the discussion with inane comments about the ‘reality’ of the
charges being made.”89 Leonardo pushes the theme of white supremacy as an alternative
frame compared to discussions utilizing the concept of white privilege, explaining,
“through discourses of supremacy the racial story unfolds, complete with characters,
action, and conflicts. More important, resolution of the plot transforms into a discreet
and pedagogical possibility.”90
David Gillborn gives scholars three questions to consider when investigating
policy and the benefactors of the policy. He states, “First…who or what is driving
education policy…second…who wins and who loses as a result of education policy
priorities…finally…what are the effects of policy.”91 These questions highlight the
inequalities of policy and the white benefactors behind the scenes. He goes on to
summarize, “…race inequity and racism are central features of the education system.
These are not aberrant nor accidental phenomena that will be ironed out in time, they are
fundamental characteristics of the system. It is in this sense that education policy is an
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act of white supremacy” (italics in original).92 He further explains that unless policy is
intentionally working to level the playing field between students of different races, the
system will function to support white supremacy through policies such as tracking,
testing, and funding. 93
Major Desegregation Policy Critiques
Many studies exist debating the effectiveness of desegregation plans around the
U.S. A few of the major books written are The Carrot or the Stick for School
Desegregation Policy, by Christine Rossell and Forced Justice, by David Armor.94 Both
books take a comprehensive approach to explaining what different local school boards
across the country did in desegregation efforts.. They use metrics like the index of
dissimilarly (how evenly two races are distributed across a region), index of racial
isolation (ratio of how much a particular racial group is exposed to itself), index of
exposure (how much interacting different racial groups have to each other), and ideas
from sociology like the harm and benefit thesis (segregation between the city and
suburban districts is harmful to city students) to show how much a district was able to
desegregate.95
David Armor has significant research experience in the field of desegregation
policy analysis. He was called on to testify in different desegregation suits across the
country and was considered a leading authority in analyzing success of desegregation
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efforts.96 He has a background in educational law, policy, and sociology, which combine
to give him important perspective on the myriad issues facing local and state school
boards in desegregation efforts. His background in social science gives him the ability to
include effective analysis of the issue of housing segregation as it connects to liability of
districts in maintaining segregated schools. Armor explains the harm and benefit thesis
by stating that segregated schools are harmful to the education of non-white children and
desegregation is beneficial to both children of color and white children. 97 He guides the
reader through the major court cases after Brown, explains the harm and benefit thesis
through social science research, links housing segregation to school segregation and its
connection to important court decisions, and analyzes mandatory and voluntary
desegregation plan effectiveness. His research is comprehensive and shows that most
desegregation efforts resulted in little long-term integration in schools.
Christine Rossell is another major player in desegregation research and litigation
starting in the 1970s through the 1990s and is considered an expert on different measures
to gauge desegregation effectiveness. 98 She compares voluntary and mandatory
desegregation plans in 119 districts across the country, including an analysis of how they
have changed over time, how these plans are measured for effectiveness, and the effect of
magnet schools on desegregation policy. One of her main philosophical arguments is that
while originally she contended that mandatory desegregation plans were more effective,
once magnet-voluntary plans entered the policy landscape after the Swann decision,
everything changed. She concludes that voluntary plans with magnet schools (as an
incentive) are more effective at interracial exposure, what she considers the best measure
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of desegregation. She states, “voluntary desegregation plans produce significantly more
interracial exposure over time than mandatory desegregation plans.”99 Her work goes
against 30 years of previous research that had focused primarily on the success of
mandatory desegregation policies. She was able to prove through the use of two major
data sets, one of 119 school districts, and the other of 20 large city desegregation
programs, that voluntary desegregation plans resulted in longer lasting racial
integration.100
Exacerbation of White Flight
While the mandatory busing of students is not the focus of this study, it does have
importance to the larger discussion of desegregation programs throughout the U.S. due to
the impact it had on the demographic landscape of cities and subsequently schools.
Busing was a major component of court ordered desegregation plans in St. Louis and
around the country from 1971-1976 and phased out by the early 1980s in lieu of
expanded voluntary measures of desegregation, such as magnet schools.101
To specifically demonstrate the effect of busing on population figures, Rossell
explains,
at the same time that white racial intolerance was declining, white flight was
increasing. With the advent of the post-Swann mandatory reassignment plans,
white enrollment losses in the north…rose to 10 percent…and in the
South…white losses went to 7.5 percent.102
The 1970s were a time when more and more courts were mandating cross-district busing,
but it had the consequence of driving whites from the cities altogether. Mandatory
busing became more unpopular as time went on and Rossell quotes a 1982 Gallup poll
99
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that found “77 percent of the white population opposed the busing of school children for
the purpose of racial balance.”103
Armor also confirms these assertions in explaining that the major reason small
improvements to Black exposure are seen as outcomes of desegregation policies is
primarily due to the loss of white students caused by their mass exodus from the cities. 104
Without large numbers of white students remaining in public school systems, there was
not a mathematical way schools could desegregate to the levels expected by the courts. It
just was not possible to fully and completely integrate the schools with the students left
after white flight from districts across the country, and St. Louis was very typical in this
way. Mentioned previously is the contribution that busing had on the increase in white
flight to the suburbs. Rossell explains this shift, “social science research suggests that
there is greater white flight when whites are reassigned to minority schools, when the
busing distance is longer and there are alternative to the public schools available.”. 105
Whether forced or voluntary, intra-district busing was not helping to solve the
problem of segregated schools, and in the mid-1970s, districts and courts around the
country began looking for new ways to integrate the public school systems as data
continued to show the increasing white student migration out of the city center towards
the suburbs. 106
Magnet Schools: Intentionally Designed for White Students
Policy makers designed magnet schools as a new type of school with specialized
curricula and flush with resources. Magnet schools first appeared in two federal district
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court settlements: one in Buffalo, New York and the other in Milwaukee, Wisconsin.107
These were the first court plans to rely significantly on magnet schools to achieve
desegregation. Metz explains, “magnet schools were made formally different from
others…there quickly developed a perception that they were superior.”108 Inherent in
their design, magnet schools provided more than what the traditional neighborhood
school offered students. Rossell explains, “the superior resources in magnet school and
the innovative curricula ‘earn’ the participation of whites.”.109
Magnet schools were designed from the beginning to attract white students so that
largely non-white districts could put forth the façade of integrated schools. Armor states,
“Other than mandatory assignment, the only effective way to attract sizable numbers of
white students to predominantly minority school is to install magnet programs that offer
specialized curriculum or instructional styles not available in regular neighborhood
schools”. 110 Again, it is the recruitment of white students, not offering a higher quality
school to African Americans, that was the impetus behind magnet schools. However,
Metz explains, “While implicit superiority in the magnet schools was a strength in
the short term…in the long run it sparked controversy because it undermined the formal
claim that the schools of the city were all equal”.111 If magnet schools were superior,
what did that do to the public perception of neighborhood schools?
Even though magnet schools were highly specialized and filled with extra
resources and special programs, high white enrollment did not always follow. Metz
states, “there were longer waiting lists for Blacks at magnet schools than there were for
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whites, and in some cases Blacks were on waiting lists while there were open spaces for
whites.”.112 This fact links back to the ideas quoted above, that whites were still not
comfortable sending their children to schools in majority African American
neighborhoods. One sociology study found when the enrollment ratio exceeded 50%
African American, white parents did not allow their children to attend and the school then
had empty “white” seats.113
Interest convergence theory has been previously discussed and is a part of
Rossell’s analysis of the effectiveness of voluntary versus mandatory magnet programs.
Rossell states, “voluntary-magnet school plans may be more effective desegregation tools
than mandatory plans because they structure the environment so that the white interest in
a superior education converges with the interest of Blacks in achieving racial equality”. 114
This assertion demonstrates if a superior school product is put forth, just by the nature of
its being exclusive, white families will be drawn to enroll their children. However,
magnet schools will not overcome the purely racist mindset of some white families.
Summary and Conclusion
Critical Race Theory is an important part of this study and serves as the backbone
for the examination of SLPS policy over the last half-century. The perspective of
historical revisionism has a contested place in the history of education, but due to the
nature of the subject in this study, it is extremely relevant and useful. Magnet schools
were created for the main purpose of attracting white students back into districts whose
student populations had been decimated by white flight in the years immediately
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following the Brown decision. They were not designed with African Americans in mind,
and their lingering nature is only testament to the stronghold white supremacy has on
educational policy in the United States. The lasting legacy of a two-tiered system is that
some schools, faculty, and students have been relegated to a school they concretely know
is different because it was designed that way. Rossell states, “the principals, teachers,
and students in the regular [non-magnet] schools may feel as if they are the stepchildren
of the school system.”.115
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Chapter Three: Methods
Introduction
In this study, the problem of tiered schooling within the St. Louis Public Schools
(SLPS) is the focal point of the research. Since Brown v. Topeka Board of Education,
public school districts around the country have grappled with the best and most effective
way to desegregate schools, often coming up shorthanded. Schools in urban areas across
the United States have not largely been successfully desegregated, yet significant
amounts of money have been spent by legislatures and state and local school boards
towards this end since the initial 1954 court decision and others that followed Brown.
Specifically, the St. Louis Public Schools have maintained two tiers of schools since the
inception of magnet schools in 1976 as part of its policy efforts to achieve desegregation.
This system of tiered schools prevents all students in the city from having access to highquality schools and the extra resources allotted to the magnet school programs.
This study aims to highlight this discrepancy in an effort to abolish this unequal
system of schools through the use of Critical Race Theory as both a tool of liberation and
of proposing radical change. The purpose of this study is not only to name the racist and
classist practices of the SLPS that developed as a result of lawsuits, court decisions, and
settlements, but also to propose an alternative system for achieving equality in the school
system. Critical Race Theory requires that injustice is not only named and exposed but
also that radical solutions are proposed to help abolish the injustice.
In this chapter, I outline and justify the chosen research design, situate myself as a
researcher, describe the methods for data collection and analysis, explain the major
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sources of data for this study, discuss the limitations of the data, and outline a timeline for
the research process.
Research Design
This study is qualitative in nature and specifically focuses within the field of
critical research as I highlight power structures and how they have been reinforced over
time.116 Merriam states that the purpose of critical research is to change, emancipate or
empower the subjects highlighted in the study. 117 In critical research orientation, it is not
enough to simply name injustice; the researcher must also outline a plan for change to
alleviate the injustice observed in the data. Some quantitative data are included in the
study to supplement and enhance the critical policy analysis, but the research orientation
remains entirely qualitative.
Within the orientation of critical qualitative research, this study examines the
development and implementation of a specific educational policy within the SLPS since
1954. This nature of this study lends itself to incorporating elements from the field of
historical analysis as a part of the research design. This study is not solely looking at one
moment in time but rather is taking the approach of a comprehensive investigation of
desegregation policy over time, hence justifying a historical orientation. The methods of
data collection are aided in validity and reliability by inclusion of historical methods in
the design.
Historical Revisionism
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As introduced in Chapter Two, historical revisionism is a process by which
scholars look at history and reframe the outcomes of policy decisions through the impact
they had on people at the margins of society, often people of color or members of the
lower class. From Reese and Rury, “Katz and the other revisionist educational historians
argued that the public schools were not heralds of freedom and democracy, but had
served as instruments of ideological domination and economic exploitation.”.118 This
frame is exactly where my study will fit into the existing scholarship. Schools have been
presented to society as the great equalizer across lines of difference, but as this study
shows, that is not the case in St. Louis with school desegregation policy. Using the lens
of historical revisionism, this study contributes to the literature in this field and broadens
the scope of what is known about how policy decisions negatively impact people on the
margins. Reese and Rury further explain this justification as they argued that schools
“had usually reinforced class inequities and social injustice.”. 119
Magnet school policy can also be considered curriculum for purposes of this
discussion because magnet schools are traditionally organized schools that contain
specialized programming within their curricular options. Watkins states, “the historical
role of the curriculum vis-a-vis African Americans has been an oppressive one that
supports racial inequality, class divisions and white hegemony”. 120 A revisionist lens is
imperative to expose these inequalities and generate impetus for radical change in the
case of magnet school policy.
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Critical Race Theory
Within the field of critical research, I outlined in Chapter Two how Critical Race
Theory is my main theory to highlight oppression. How these two fields approach
research has been explained in Chapter Two, so in this chapter I instead focused on
identifying my location as a researcher with regards to race, class, and gender, as these
intersect to form my position and must be fully and transparently explained in order to
demonstrate my ability to dissect these oppressions and explain how they intertwine in
harming people of color and those in poverty.
Position of the Researcher
As a white scholar of CRT, it is important to explain who I am and where I am
located philosophically. It is critical to consider my position with regards to qualitative
research, since as Merriam notes “the researcher is the primary instrument for data
collection and analysis.”. 121 Critical Race Theory explains that everyone has a unique
perspective that situates their experience as a result primarily of their gender, race, and
class. Why is my location important to the research? I must situate myself with my
white, upper middle class, female identity clearly for the audience in order to be
transparent about my perspective and where I come from as a researcher. Since I benefit
from white privilege and participate both intentionally and unintentionally in white
supremacy, I must be transparent and honest about how my whiteness has impacted me in
order to demonstrate my ability to critique a system that disenfranchises those from a
different location. Knowing my location and clearly articulating it for my audience are
important starting points in a qualitative CRT analysis if my voice is going to have any
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credibility. Merriam explains that because the researcher is the primary vehicle for data
collection and interpretation in qualitative research, the researcher must identify and
explain biases and shortcomings ahead of data analysis. 122 What follows is my attempt to
lay bare for the reader my location as a researcher.
Who I am
I am a white female who has worked in the SLPS since 2005. I originally came to
St. Louis as a member of Teach for America and was not traditionally educated as a
teacher. I taught chemistry and Advanced Placement chemistry at Central Visual and
Performing Arts High School. In my time with the district, I have also worked at
Roosevelt High School and Gateway STEM High School, providing me with
extraordinary experiences in both magnet and comprehensive schools. Currently, I am an
administrator, a position I have occupied for five years. I am an insider with regards to
the SLPS system yet an outsider with regards to the receivers of school desegregation
policy. Since I am not a person of color, I must be cognizant of how I represent the
communities I am studying: not speaking for them in harmful or misleading ways, but
rather witnessing publically the harm that policy has caused their community. As a white
person, naming the harm that almost exclusively white-policy makers are responsible for
is a demonstration of my anti-racist identity and an effort to use academic avenues to
bring awareness to the lasting impacts of white supremacy on marginalized communities.
As a young child, my race and class never negatively impacted my educational
outcomes; in fact, they afforded me great opportunity. At six years old, I move with my
family to Indiana from Kansas as a result of my father receiving a job offer at a local
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hospital. He was offered jobs in two other cities, but he and my mother specifically
chose Indiana as it had the highest-rated school system of the three offers he received.
So, from the beginning of my formal schooling, my parents clearly exercised choice with
regards to the educational system in which they placed my brothers and me. That choice
was a result of their location, both racially and financially. I first began to peel back the
layers of my privileged position as a Women’s Studies major in college. It was in the
pursuit of that degree that I got my first exposure to understanding the immense privilege
I had been granted by my whiteness and class position.
I was never subjected to harmful education policy as a K-12 student; rather, I had
access to a high-quality public school system throughout my educational career. Both of
my parents and half of my grandparents have advanced degrees, and my extended family
has all completed an undergraduate education at a minimum, with several possessing
advanced degrees. My family history is one that exudes privilege with regards to
educational opportunity since generations of my family have had access to both high
quality K-12 schools and the ability to pursue higher education with financial support
from the family when needed.
Additionally, I am not native to St. Louis; therefore I did not grow up within or
around the complex social system I am studying. This city is a unique case study for
researching educational systems, and people experience the educational landscape here
very differently, depending on their race, gender, and class. Thus, I did not have the
same experience I am studying. Merriam describes the emic (insider) and etic (outsider)
perspectives in the description of qualitative research. 123 I feel I have both perspectives,
to some degree. While I did not grow up or experience the SLPS firsthand, I now work
123
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inside the system and have experienced the two different school types (magnet and
comprehensive) I am researching.
Data Sources and Categories
For the purposes of this study, data used is from primary source documents of
varying types. This study does not heavily rely upon secondary source documents, as the
critique of desegregation policy being made in this study has not been primarily featured
in the literature. As outlined in Chapter Two, while analysis has been made about the
various St. Louis desegregation plans, it has largely focused on inter/intra district busing,
so secondary sources are going to be limited in the new knowledge they can provide this
study.
Several different types of data are used in this study, and they are described next
using explanations found in Merriam and Gall, Gall, and Borg.124 Personal documents as
a formal description include examples of written communication to parents about the
magnet school enrollment process, personal communication between individuals, and
letters from members of the district to the superintendent or legal counsel. Public records
in this study refer to documents that are official in nature, emanating from a public
organization or a legal entity such as the Missouri Supreme Court. Some examples of
public records would be school board minutes, desegregation policy literature,
handbooks, court testimony, and school achievement reports. Merriam explains that
while newspapers could be considered part of the public record, and because they are
written for an audience in a specific time to convey a specific message, they are given the
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further classification as popular culture documents.125 Newspapers represent an
important archival data source for this study, specifically because of the variety of racial
perspectives they represent. Quantitative records were also integrated into this study and
include enrollment data, school budgets, test scores, and any information that is primarily
numerical.
A majority of the data used in this study comes from public or archival records,
specifically newspaper articles, school board minutes, and transcripts or decisions from
court proceedings.
Data Collection Procedures
The summer of 2015 is when the majority of data collection occurred, primarily at
the following local institutions: Missouri History Museum, St. Louis City Library, SLPS
Board of Education Archives, Mercantile Library at UMSL, and the St. Louis County
Library. During this period, time was spent in the archives of the previously mentioned
institutions, where I gathered information about magnet and comprehensive school policy
through sources like Microfilm, card catalogue, and historical groups of files. The SLPS
Board archives were accessed and copies of historical documents were made, organized
by theme and date, and catalogued. Date ranges were gleaned from the newspaper record
of important events to help organize and guide the research.
Data Sources
While working within these archival institutions, these data are used to
demonstrate adopted policies and their implementation narrative after the Brown decision
and as a result of the 1975 Consent Decree, 1980 Intracity Settlement and 1983
125
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Interdistrict Settlement Agreement. The St. Louis Post Dispatch has an important role to
play in this study. As the largest and oldest newspaper still published in St. Louis, it was
a major source of data on the perception of implementation of the desegregation plan.
However, it is a primarily white, conservative institution and only offers one perspective
to the story, so it does not stand alone as a data point. The St. Louis Argus and St. Louis
American, two examples of prominent African American newspapers, were used as a
counterpoint to the dominant narrative from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. As other nondominant, less well-known news sources were found, they were also included in data
collection.
There has been other scholarship written about the St. Louis desegregation plan,
and it has been included as relevant to this policy analysis and critique. These pieces of
scholarship provide important context to this study, but also serve to highlight areas of
deficiency in the existing literature, since their focus is mainly on inter/intra district
busing. Other sources of data include the Missouri Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education (DESE), the accreditation-granting institution of Missouri. This
source was used to cross-reference historical enrollment patterns and school quality
measures where data exists. The Missouri History Museum and the three identified
library systems contain many different historical documents that were investigated and
incorporated into the study as relevant. Transcripts of the legal proceedings of the
different courts involved in the litigation over time with SLPS were included as they
provide another piece of the story that was presented to different presiding judges at
different levels of the judicial system.
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There are specific data sources not chosen for inclusion in this study, specifically,
personal interviews with magnet or comprehensive school attendees or their parents. Due
to the timeline for completion for data collection and the proposed scope of study, these
were excluded. However, there is an expressed intent to come back to this part of the
study at a later date and include these important perspectives. Focusing on the official
record allows the critique to be made solely with policy evidence, not memory or
personal experience, therefore allowing a critique of the implementation of policy based
on non-opinion sources. To me, that lends credence to the claims of white supremacy
since the data sources remain objective in nature.
Sample Process
Purposeful sampling was used to choose which magnet and comprehensive
schools are included in the study.126 Those chosen for inclusion demonstrated strong
historical narratives in both the news media and in board policy. Specifically, criterion
sampling was used to select schools that are either magnet or comprehensive in their
classification for the district.127
These stories include the gifted and talented magnet programs, visual and
performing arts magnet programs, ROTC magnet programs, and the science and math
focused magnet programs. These magnet programs were the most prevalent ones the
courts continued to fund throughout the litigation.
The work and policies of committees appointed by the court were included as
they appeared in the records. Additionally, non-integrated school (NIS) policies and
programs were also investigated, and specific policies were highlighted due to the
126
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prevalence of data explaining and documenting their impact over time. This study does
not claim to be completely comprehensive regarding every policy made during the
implementation of the Settlement; rather, it purposefully highlights those policies that
significantly contributed to the continued oppression of students in NIS and the ways
white supremacy played a role in shaping policy.
Data analysis
Data are reported chronologically in a narrative format to trace the development,
implementation, and effect of policy over time. Various schools are included to gauge
the impact of policy and to compare/contrast the effects of policy on the two school
types. Since most of the data sources are primary in nature, there is no prior
interpretation to rely upon. Although some documents may have a filter from the author
that may cloud the truth and reality of the African American experience, these documents
represent the “official” record and have been analyzed as such with an eye towards a
critical analysis. Historians and librarians were used to attest to both reliability and
validity of data sources discovered. The interpretation of documents and records
throughout this process has been solely the responsibility of the researcher.
Both dominant and non-dominant news sources were used in addition to public
record official documents, allowing varying perspectives to be highlighted and contrasted
in this study. Gall, Gall, and Borg list several techniques to judge the accuracy and
authenticity of historical documents: external and internal criticism. 128 External
criticisms ask the following questions of the data: Is the origin of the document accurate?
Is it genuine? Is it the original copy? Who wrote it, when and where? Internal criticisms
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ask the following questions of the data: Is the material contained inside the document
accurate? Is the stated material consistent for the time it was written? Could events have
happened in the sequence described? Does the author have expertise in this area to speak
with authority? Does the author have bias? I asked myself both types of questions as I
dove into the archival data.
The data analysis process started with a thorough reading for comprehension of
information contained in the pieces found in the archives. Articles were summarized for
inclusion and quoted as necessary in each analysis chapter. Content analysis is a
procedure for describing communication and is used as appropriate with newspaper
stories selected for inclusion in this study.129
After the data were read and analyzed, I then drew conclusions and made
interpretations from the data. The literature provided possible criteria for confirming
interpretations from document-based data. As quoted in Gall, Gall and Borg some
criteria are, “internal coherence, external coherence, correspondence between theory and
data, fruitfulness of the theoretical suppositions and the trustworthiness, credentials and
status of author and supporters of interpretation.”130 With regards to the official
documents of the Board of Education, they were considered authentic and not questioned
for authenticity since they were retrieved directly from the Board’s archives. However,
studies have shown that Board documents may omit some perspectives or the experiences
of marginalized children within the district, which is where this study is located. Using
the official record to document how actual Board policy and legal mandates serve to
continue to marginalize children of color within the SLPS is a larger goal of this study.
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Because this study uses both historical revisionism and CRT as its research
methods, the data analysis procedures must fit into those models. There is not one
specific way outlined in the literature to conduct research or analyze data using these
models; rather it is an interpretation the researcher must develop throughout the analysis.
The methods of data analysis described in this section demonstrate flexibility, while also
providing space to maintain scholarly acceptance in the educational landscape at large.
Also, the positioning of this researcher as the primary point of analysis affirms the
necessity for locating myself so clearly at the beginning of this chapter.
Limitations
As suggested earlier, the primary limitation with historical research of this nature
is that data simply may not exist or was not found in the archives I chose for this study.
While I was attempting to be as comprehensive as possible in the different sources I
chose, there are pieces of the history that were probably not present in these locations or
were overlooked in my searches. Owning that this study does not claim to be
comprehensive of all policy or all harm done to the African American community in this
time period is one way I acknowledge that gaps inevitably exist in my retelling of the
history.
Since I was the one to interpret and analyze the data, my lens and perspective
must be made clearly transparent for the reader, which is why I’ve included the thorough
explanation at the start of this chapter about my location and perspective as a researcher.
Since I am not a person of color or someone who has grown up in St. Louis, I have clear
limits about what I can understand and synthesize as an outsider to this city. While I
have spent several years studying St. Louis and over ten years working within the SLPS,
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I cannot compensate for not living the experience that is the school choice conundrum
facing inhabitants of St. Louis city at some time in their lives.
Lastly, one major limitation of this study was not including interviews with
people who have either attended the identified schools or enrolled their children in these
schools. Interviews were omitted from this study strategically and deliberately, and while
this could be perceived as a glaring void, it provides a clear direction for future research
and scholarship. I recognize the value of interviews and personal accounts of the
injustices experienced by students attending under-resourced schools and intend to come
back to these data sources in time.
At the present, the study design is complete and comprehensive in scope with
solely the written records of the desegregation policy in St. Louis. To include interviews
would bog down this study and ultimately delay its release. Merriam justifies this
approach by stating, “one of the greatest advantages in using documentary material is its
stability. Unlike interviewing and observation, the presence of the investigator does not
alter what is being studied. Documents are objective sources of data compared to other
forms”.131 While Board documents may be skewed in their intent or outcomes, they do
not have a problem with memory or injecting opinion where fact only should be
recorded.
This study focuses on the written record to investigate if the SLPS, State of
Missouri judges, and committees appointed by the court have indeed acted in ways that
perpetuate the subordination of people of color and maintained both separate and unequal
schools. By focusing entirely on the written record, the study speaks louder and with
more authority since people’s interpretation of events or their emotional connection to the
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study does not enter into the data. To clearly demonstrate the effects and impacts of
white supremacy over time through school policy, I intentionally save the voice of the
oppressed individuals for the second part of this story, focusing first on the specific
policies that have created this apartheid-like system and illuminating them for a larger
audience. As Ms. Minnie Liddell once said about herself, I too vow, “to be a fly in the
authorities’ buttermilk,” bringing to light the grave injustice being done to children of
color within the St. Louis Public School system. 132
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Chapter 4: Setting the Framework
Introduction
In undertaking a research project of this magnitude, covering over 40 years of
policy-making, involving more than 6,000 legal briefs filed with a multitude of judges in
several different levels of court, and impacting more than 100,000 children, it would be
arrogant and shortsighted of me to assume I would be able to completely cover the entire
story. I state, from the start, that I am cognizant of the holes in the story I tell in this
dissertation. As I continue to research this saga and dive deeper into specific parts of the
desegregation policy at play in the St. Louis Public Schools, those holes will become
smaller, but as a historian, I will never be able to recreate the story as it originally
happened with complete accuracy. This study is not intended to be a deep history; rather,
it is intended to show how a critical analysis allows one to clearly see the heavy hand of
white supremacy at work in public policy that superficially intended to aid a marginalized
and oppressed community.
This chapter attempts to outline for the reader the different parties and individuals
who had influence over desegregation policy in SLPS, while organizing them into
categories of protagonist and antagonist, white supremacists and active resistors. Some
actors were actively supporting structures that benefited white students and their families,
whereas others were working subversively to dismantle the oppressive system of public
schooling in the SLPS school district. There were also others who were working for the
benefit of the African American children and families who were the intended benefactors
of the litigation that Ms. Liddell originated in 1972.

55

Another 40 years of Inequity: Two-Tier Schooling as the Lasting Legacy of
Desegregation in St. Louis, Missouri
Throughout this story, it is critical to acknowledge the role that white supremacy
plays throughout the course of the saga. Similar to a bass drum beating cadence for an
orchestra, it is always there in the background, keeping the beat for all the other
instruments in the arrangement. Sometimes the score calls for the bass drum to have a
more prominent role; at other times, it is faint and hardly discernable to the untrained ear.
What I am attempting to do for the reader is lay bare the facts and figures clearly
demonstrating how the invisible hand of white supremacy has been steadily beating
cadence in the St. Louis Public Schools for quite some time. The policies enacted
continue to oppress children, and the dual system created by these policies has been
established to oppress children for the foreseeable future. In court documents as early as
the 1970s, policymakers knew that the plan was not working for the majority of African
American children, yet they continued to push for more of the same, year after year.
Metro-wide plan
The newly elected Board of Education President, Mr. James E. Hurt, Jr., first
proposed a regional integration plan in 1967.133 From the Globe Democrat, “Convincing
St. Louis County residents that helping St. Louis Public Schools solve their problem will
serve their own self-interest is part of the large task Mr. Hurt has set for himself and
fellow board members in the coming year.”134 This position was a very radical one for
the President of the Board of Education to take and a position that led to whites viewing
him as a traitor to his race because of his strong advocacy for the African American
students and families of SLPS.
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A decade later, the new president of the SLPS Board of Education was again
beginning to warm up to the idea of a metro-wide desegregation plans after a report from
the U.S. Civil Rights Commission came out in support of such ideas. 135 The Rev. Donald
E. Mayer, Board of Education president stated, “It’s a strong possibility…[in the report to
Judge Meredith] the idea that a metropolitan solution should be studied, that we ought to
get into that. It may be a strong part of our proposal…[the U.S. Civil Rights Commission
Report] was encouraging and adds substance to what the board has been saying for a long
time.”136 This position is significant because again, the president of the Board of
Education, along with Dr. James DeClue, a member of the St. Louis School Board’s
Citizens Task Force, was advocating for African American children in ways that made
white readers squeamish, especially given that they had fled the city to retreat to all-white
enclaves in the county. The proposition that they be forced to integrate with the city
school system was in direct opposition to the mentality that led to such dramatic white
flight.
The district knew it could not get meaningful, widespread desegregation with the
racial demographics of the system present in the mid-1970s, and by continually pushing
for a metro-wide plan, it was trying to share the perceived burden of desegregation with
the surrounding districts. As reported by Sheila Rule in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
“The board said: ‘When it is considered that the City of St. Louis, whose
boundaries are coterminous with those of the school district, is neither a
true economic nor a social unity, but to the contrary, merely part and
parcel of a broader community, the conclusion is compelling that only a
metropolitan plan, encompassing the neighboring two tiers of the school
districts in St. Louis County, with their low ratio of minority students, will
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provide the opportunity to achieve the necessary viability and stability of
the racial mix of the whole area.137
The district knew mathematically desegregating a district that was roughly 70%
Black and 30% white was going to be a statistical impossibility. By reaching into the
county for white students, the district perceived it could meet the goals of a racially
balanced school system; without a more even demographic mix of children, it was
impossible.
Setting The Stage for Litigation
In the twenty-year period following the Brown decision, SLPS struggled to
integrate for several reasons, but the most central cause of the problem of segregated
schools was segregated housing patterns, which were firmly entrenched across the city.
An article in March of 1970 from the Globe-Democrat highlighted this problem, stating,
“St. Louis…may no longer be free to allow segregated residential patterns to take their
course in the form of separate schools for whites and Negroes.” The article went on to
explain, “In the quarter century from 1942 to 1976, white enrollment in the SLPS
plunged from 78 to 37 per cent, while Negro enrollment climbed from 22 to 63 per
cent.”138
There was an underlying fear held by white policymakers, specifically on the
Board of Education and at the city level, that any policy changes towards a forced
integration would lead to a continued exodus of whites, only exacerbating the racial
separation and disproportion. The Superintendent of SLPS in 1970, William Kottmeyer,
was quoted in this article explaining that large-scale integration would “prompt the most
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massive exodus of whites to the county that you’ve ever seen.”139 He and others in SLPS
knew that any policy supporting integration would face opposition and would further
divide and alienate the majority of white residents in the city. Daniel Schlafly was a
board member from 1953 to 1981 and was an active member of the school board, helping
to shape the direction of the district through this time period. 140
The pressure to integrate increased again in 1973 when a federal court ordered the
Nixon administration to take action against eight St. Louis area school districts as
reported in the Globe-Democrat on February 17, 1973. The article references the 1971
Supreme Court decision. The directive came from the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (HEW) and pushed districts closer to busing as a means of desegregation. 141
Pressure was mounting on policy- makers to do something, or they would be forced into
litigation with the Federal government, which they stood no chance of winning.
Financial woes exacerbate issues
In addition to its struggles with how to successfully address segregation in the
city’s schools, the SLPS were also dealing with a declining tax base and population that
would not support tax levees for the school system. According to Kathryn Waters, “St.
Louis has had a substantial decline in property values in the last four years and the voters
have turned down five proposed tax levy increases since 1971.”142 This loss of revenue
and inability to increase the tax levy left the school district in terrible financial shape. In
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May of 1975, the Missouri Board of Education lowered the district’s rating from AAA to
AA status, an indicator of financial health of school districts statewide. 143
Judge Meredith
Judge Meredith was the first judge to preside over the litigation of the Liddell
case: the Consent Decree signed in December of 1975. The most powerful part of this
first decree was the assignment of blame for racial segregation to the St. Louis Public
Schools, specifically charging the district with “perpetuating racial segregation and
discrimination.”144 Judge Meredith likely knew that St. Louis whites would not accept a
forced busing remedy to the problem of segregation, and thus used the moment of change
to bend towards interest convergence for whites, giving them a perk imbedded within the
integration efforts of the court. Here is the first example of the persistent drumbeat of
white supremacy in the story of the desegregation litigation in St. Louis.
The Consent Decree began a system of magnet schools that would “be designed
to make them so attractive that students of both races from all areas of the city would
want to attend them.”145 Judge Meredith’s ruling seemed in line with popular opinion for
the white majority: that it was much more effective to use a carrot than a stick to bring
integration to the white population of St. Louis.
Paul B. Rava, one of the attorneys for the SLPS, explained the shift “from
compulsory to voluntary action, which is better than when it’s mandated from the
outside,” lending credence to the common sentiment towards incentivizing integration for
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whites.146 Here is an example of white supremacy dictating policy through interest
convergence: while African Americans brought the suit against the district for the awful
conditions of their schools on the North Side and the dire situation they were in, the
judicial remedy to this problem was building better schools that would in turn attract
white students back to the district, effectively flipping the narrative from the plight of the
African American students of the district to the benefits that could be conjured up for the
white students.
According to a May 4, 1976 St. Louis Post-Dispatch article, Judge Meredith
explained that choice would be the solution to the school integration problem facing
SLPS, and the proposed school choice method of magnet schools was the best way to
proceed demonstrating that interest convergence would rein in the litigation. The elected
SLPS Board of Education also came out in support of choice and voluntary integration in
that same Post-Dispatch article in 1976.147 Again, they both held the interest of white
students and families as the primary concern as they created policy in wake of the
litigation brought against the district by African American families.
However, even with the promise of higher-than-average quality schools, white
citizens of St. Louis were reluctant to apply for the new magnet schools. Linda Eardley
reported, “Samuel Miller, Director of the magnet school program, said Tuesday that
considerably more than 3,000 of the approximately 4,500 students who have signed up to
attend the nine magnet schools set to open this fall are black. ‘We are still recruiting, and
at this point we still need white applicants,’ Miller said.” 148 Superintendent Robert
Wentz also voiced the same concern saying he “was hopeful that enough white students
146
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could be attracted to achieve the racial balance required by a consent decree signed last
December.”149 However, four months after the opening of the first magnet schools in St.
Louis, “that program involve[d] about 2,500 of the city’s 88,500 students.”150 Roughly
2.8% of the students in the city of St. Louis were able to get access to the new elite
magnet schools in the first year, hardly enough to have a statistically significant impact
on district-wide integration efforts.
Details of the 1975 Consent Decree
The nine magnet schools proposed in 1976 by the district and citizens’ advisory
committee were “an elementary school that would stress discipline and the basics; a
career-oriented junior high school; an elementary school stressing individualized
learning; an elementary school emphasizing biology; an elementary school with
computerized instruction; a junior high school concentrating on the arts, a school that
would teach students to be fluent in Spanish as well as in English; a mathematics and
science high school, and an arts high school.”151
In addition to the formation of nine new magnet schools, the original Consent
Decree also contained other ways for integration within schools to be fostered including
developing programs of emphasis, pairing six high schools with 60 students each to
attend special content talks at institutions around St. Louis, pairing of schools to share in
extracurricular activities (sporting events, newspaper clubs, drama and music
performances), team teaching, a guest speaker program to highlight accomplishments of
both races, and the creation of a Vocational Information Center which would highlight
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voc-ed options in the city.152 All of these programs would be funded by the School
Board and did not involve the citizens’ advisory committee, which was required as part
of the Department of Health Education and Welfare grant application for the magnet
schools.153
The Consent Decree gave the white citizens of St. Louis a palatable way to
address the claims of the Concerned Parents of North St. Louis and begin new efforts,
albeit minor, to desegregate the public schools. By focusing on choice instead of forcing
integration through a mechanism like cross-district busing, policy was written with white
students and families in mind, and those white families were specifically pandered to in
order to achieve the goals of the Consent Decree.
Funding of the Consent Decree
Initially, funding of the Consent Decree was the responsibility of the SLPS Board
of Education and was very minimal, with the district assuming responsibility for
increases in transportation costs in addition to the costs of the new programs.154 The
district had tried five different times since 1971 to get a school tax levy passed, and
finally in April of 1976, the city approved one by a narrow margin, earning 50.9 percent
of the total vote.155 This particular vote highlighted the deep racial division within the
city, according to St. Louis Argus: “The intensely property-conscious South Side nearly
did us in this time again, voting against humanity by an incredible two-to-one margin.
North Side voters, mostly Black, favored the tax increase three to one but failed to get out
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the vote as well as did the organized South Siders.”156 The tax increase may have finally
passed because citizens realized the district had clear next steps for integration, and white
families may have seen they would benefit from the newly formed school designs.
Whatever the reason, this barely passing vote by the citizens of the city was a critical step
towards funding the many needs of the beleaguered district.
Leading up to and during the summer of 1976, there was a lot of action on the part
of the school board to secure federal funds to operate the magnet schools. Specifically,
Sam Miller, Director of the magnet school program, said, “the district expects to receive
$1,500,000 in federal Emergency School Aid Act (ESAA) funds to finance the
program…but that amount is less than half the funds requested by the school board last
February…the district has received no word as to whether a second application for
$3,500,000 submitted in July, will be approved. That money will go for two more
magnet schools and additional magnet programs to be set up in September and
January.”157 The district simply did not have the money to initiate the magnet schools
and without the federal funding, would not have been able to run the schools effectively
with their increased and highly specialized personnel and program requirements.
In the second semester of the 1976-1977 school year, the Board of Education
again appealed to the Federal Government for emergency aid to further support their
desegregation efforts, specifically $4.69 million dollars. 158 Robert Joiner reported in the
St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “The board says it wants to use the funds to continue its Magnet
School Program in an effort to desegregate the city’s high schools and elementary
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schools.”159 Again, the district was in a situation where they could not expand magnet
schools, meeting the objectives of the Consent Decree, without the support of the federal
government. Because the district was without a tax increase from 1971-1975, the reserve
funds had been severely depleted; thus, federal funds were critical to the success of the
magnets.160
In the summer before the second year of implementation of the Consent Decree,
Superintendent Wentz made it clear to the public that the district was behind the magnet
school program, with or without federal funding. Dennis Hannon of the South Side
Journal writes, “One measure of the value of the program is the school system’s
commitment to it. The magnet schools will survive even if supporting federal funds from
the ESAA were lost…such a loss ‘might mean some restructuring of priorities’ (the board
uses the federal money to spend about $400 more per child in the magnet schools than it
does in the rest of the system), but he [Supt. Wentz] said he hopes to see the magnet
schools become a permanent part of the St. Louis educational picture.”161 The South Side
Journal audience was almost exclusively white families, and they were being explicitly
pandered to in this article; the magnet school children get $400 more dollars each and
Superintendent Wentz himself was personally guaranteeing to meet the special financial
needs of the magnet schools. As a white man, he was giving white families his word that
their special schools would continue to be the best the district had to offer. Again we see
that the plaintiffs of the suit, the African American families predominantly on the North
Side, were an after-thought of policy makers.
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The NAACP Counter Story about the Consent Decree
The legal support for the plaintiffs of the Liddell case was aided tremendously by
the addition of the NAACP to the plaintiff side. The U.S. Court of Appeals ruled the
NAACP could intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs on December 13, 1976.162 Prior to
that, Mr. Joseph S. McDuffie was serving as one of the main lawyers for the Concerned
Parents of North St. Louis.163
While the status of the NAACP intervention was in court, they publically
commented on the magnet school plan at the start of the 1976-1977 school year and filed
a brief with the Court about the inadequacy of the plan. In this brief, the NAACP stated,
“The School Board tells this Court in effect that everybody is happy back on the
plantation. We are not.”164 The lack of a system-wide plan to address segregation in the
SLPS was the main contention of the NAACP; the plaintiffs of the segregation lawsuit
were not receiving enough of a remedy from the Consent Decree. The white citizens of
St. Louis did not want a system-wide remedy such as busing since it was leading to racial
conflict in cities like Boston and Detroit. Whites were unsupportive of citywide solutions
like busing and were largely not favorable towards any system-wide measures probably
due to racism they felt and internalized fear at integration.
Once allowed to intervene on behalf of the plaintiffs, the NAACP continued to
question the remedy of magnet schools. Mrs. Althea T. L Simmons, the national
education director “said at a press conference here yesterday that the magnet school
program offering specialized curriculums in certain schools was simply, ‘a method of
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delaying meaningful desegregation.’”165 The Board of Education fought the addition of
the NAACP to the plaintiff’s council, and this battle reached the Supreme Court in the
winter of 1977. Specifically, “By a 4-4 vote, with Justice Thurgood Marshall not voting,
the Court refused to delay the effect of a ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit here…the NAACP has contended that the [consent] decree does not go
far enough in integrating the school system. Many schools have all-black or all-white
student enrollments.”166
The Board of Education knew that the addition of the NAACP was going to push
the district to desegregate as much as possible and that token desegregation enacted
through magnet schools was not going to be sufficient. Specifically in the first year of
operating, the magnet schools at that time involved only 2,500 students of a total
population of 85,000; approximately 2.9% of the district had access to the specialized
schools.167 The district knew the NAACP would be fighting for a plan that involved a
much higher percentage of the children of the district, and that meant more drastic
measures at integration were coming.
Further Funding Issues of the Consent Decree
The first major financial setback came in the summer of 1976, when the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) initially denied federal funding for
the new magnet schools because of policies the district employed that “encouraged
segregation,” specifically the permissive transfer and gifted student programs. 168
“Policies that have perpetuated the segregation of black and white students in St. Louis
“NAACP criticizes magnet program,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, December 29, 1976.
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public schools have been cited by the U.S. Office of Education in temporarily
disqualifying the school district from eligibility for federal desegregation funds.”169 The
district’s racist polices were named by an agency of the federal government and
prevented a large sum of money from coming to the district, creating an urgency to pass
new policy relatively quickly because the district could not develop the high quality
programs promised by the Consent Decree without those funds.
The St. Louis Argus ran an editorial from its publisher that day criticizing the
school board. In that editorial Dr. Eugene Mitchell said,
The board has failed to monitor its programs. That failure seems to indicate a
lack of commitment by board members to desegregate our public schools. A
successful plan for integration requires two ingredients. First, it must be
recognized that segregation does exist in our schools system. Second, parents,
school personnel and board members must make an earnest and dedicated effort
to end it. The rejection of our application for badly needed funds should spur
board members to promptly grapple with the problem and to make the necessary
recommendation as soon as possible.170
The Board was now exposed by a federal agency as continuing to support segregation in
specific Board policies; there was no denying the Board’s responsibility in making
conditions worse for African American children. The drumbeat of racism was being laid
bare for the public.
The threat of withholding funds was enough to immediately spur the Board of
Education to institute policy changes; without the funds, the magnet schools would not
have been able to open in the fall of 1976, and the Board would have been in contempt of
court. They were facing quite a quagmire: they had promised specialized schools and
without the federal funds, they would not be able to run those schools. Board action was
swift. “With little debate the St. Louis Board of Education Monday night voted to
169
170

Robert L. Joiner, “Segregation cited in magnet school aid ban,” St. Louis Post-Dispatch, June 8, 1976.
Eugene N. Mitchell, “From the publisher’s desk, a plan is needed,” St. Louis Argus, June 10, 1976, 12.

68

Another 40 years of Inequity: Two-Tier Schooling as the Lasting Legacy of
Desegregation in St. Louis, Missouri
change three school policies that had encouraged a racial imbalance in student enrollment
in the system…the quick adoption of the new policies was triggered by the
announcement last week from the HEW that the district was not eligible to receive
federal magnet school funds because the old policies resulted in segregation.”171 In this
instance, interest convergence is clearly seen on the part of the Board of Education; they
had no choice but to change segregation-enhancing policy because they could not run the
mandated magnet schools without the federal funds.
Year Two Challenges
Once the NAACP was added as a plaintiff, they immediately began putting
pressure on the district for the marked lack of integration of the magnet schools within
the city boundaries. “The Court [U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit], ruled that
the Magnet School Program is not sufficient and further decreed that the NAACP be
allowed to submit an alternate desegregation plan. Further, the Court ordered that the
School Board come up with an acceptable plan to be implemented by the beginning of
the 1977-1978 school year and stated that this plan must be the final for desegregating the
SLPS.”172 The Court gave the NAACP the power to propose an alternate plan.
In the same issue of the St. Louis Argus, Dr. James DeClue, who was at that time
the chairman of the Education Committee for the St. Louis branch of the NAACP, wrote
the issue’s guest editorial. He stated, “These 4,000 students [in the magnet schools]
represent approximately 3.5 percent of the total school population; approximately 96
percent of the students are retained in totally segregated schools. This is in direct
violation of the laws. This represent nothing more than a token attempt to desegregate
171
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the schools in the City of St. Louis, and one which was doomed to failure as a
desegregation effort, from its inception.”173 He was concise and named the problem: not
enough African American students were benefiting from magnet school policies, and
resulting in continued segregation on the part of the SLPS Board of Education.
Year Three and Four- Funding Challenges Continue
Leading up to year three of the first Consent Decree on desegregation in SLPS,
funding issues again presented themselves. Going into its third year of operating magnet
schools, the Board of Education “approved an application for $2,125,997 in federal
desegregation funds to help finance the magnet school program next school year.”174
This request was for operational costs to support 10 of the 11 magnet schools the district
was running. One magnet school could not be included in the application because it did
not stay within the expected racial ratio. This application was initially denied: “‘This
year the federal review teams have turned down the St. Louis system’s $2.1 million
application in the first round of approvals,’ said Lynn Beckwith, school system director
of federal programs. Beckwith said the HEW officials specified that St. Louis was
bypassed in the initial round because they thought projects here were doing less for
desegregation than efforts in other districts.”175
Shortly after that article was published, “The Missouri Advisory Committee to the
U.S. Commission on Civil rights…voted to investigate the matter of quality integrated
education in the St. Louis area.”176 A little over a month later, “federal officials have
asked St. Louis school officials to explain why the Rock Spring and Pruitt schools, for
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students who have disciplinary problems, have not been desegregated.”177 Because
several district schools were segregated by official SLPS policy, the Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) flagged this fact as a reason why funding would continue to be denied. It
was apparent that there were many deeply seeded racial issues across the city’s schools,
and federal pressure was mounting from many different angles.
According to the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, eventually
The U.S. Department of Health Education and Welfare…released almost $1.4
million for the city’s magnet schools and special educational pilot programs after
agreeing to a compromise on racial irregularities that had held up money…the
amount of money allocated for the magnet schools is about $1.1 million less than
the St. Louis Board of Education had sought for the program…the waiver
indicates the HEW is satisfied with the district’s promises to correct some
assignment policies…The investigators had said the district’s policy of assigning
students to the city’s two tutorial schools…increased racial isolation at the
schools. HEW also cited two instances of large numbers of student transfers that
increased racial isolation.178
This cutback was a major problem for the continuation of the magnet school
program. Linda Eardley reported, “The programs at some of the magnet schools in St.
Louis would be weakened under budget cuts recommended by the U.S. HEW…many
supplies, librarians, counselors and teacher aides would be cut at many schools.”179 The
district relied heavily on federal grants for the new programs, and without this money the
district would not be able to maintain the high level of specialization in the magnet
schools. So again, the district acquiesced in yet another move of interest convergence for
the white patrons of the schools and modified the offending policy. The district was
granted the federal funds, albeit at a reduced amount.
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The district made a fourth application to the HEW for grant money in the second
semester of the 1978-1979 school year. Charles Burgess reported, “The St. Louis school
system is trying to get more federal money for its magnet school program for next
year…a request for $2,425,665.”180 With another round of funding requested, again the
SLPS were caught in a situation of needing a waiver due to racial bias in programs the
Board of Education operated. “The chief complaint this year…is the operation at Vashon
High School of an all-black branch of the O’Fallon Technical High School vocational
training center. School system officials have denied that deliberate discrimination is
involved, but have promised to close the branch and take other steps to bring the entire
O’Fallon program into compliance with OCR regulations.”181 The district got another
slap on the wrist, was forced to change the offending, segregationist policy, and then was
rewarded with HEW funds to operate the magnet schools for another school year.
The district would not change policy solely on the merits of improving the district
for African American children The only entity that was proven time and time again to
effect change in segregationist district policy was the federal government with its large
purse strings. Money was the only consistent motivator for the district, specifically the
Board of Education, forcing long overdue changes to policies that were historically
detrimental to the African American children served by SLPS.
Legal Challenges to the Consent Decree
Throughout the implementation of the 1975 Consent Decree, there was a series of
legal challenges in court over which Judge Meredith presided. Specifically, between
October of 1977 and March of 1978, the newspaper record shows increasing amounts of
180
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testimony between experts on both sides of the litigation grappling with major issues of
the case. The first of the main two legal arguments was to determine if the SLPS Board
of Education “policies deliberately perpetuated separation of races.”182 The second was
what policy the Board should implement to desegregate the district.
Experts as Witnesses
Many different desegregation experts were called to testify from around the world
in this case. William B. Field was one called by the plaintiffs; as a consultant, he had
helped the Concerned North Side parents prepare the material in the original 1972 filing.
He offered several staggering statistics in his testimony, specifically stating, “of 78
construction projects put into operation in the years 1954-1973, 61 were in black areas of
the city. ‘The black population was effectively corralled in these small school zones’ he
said.”183 He went on to say, “In 1972-1973, only 7 percent of the 105,000 students in the
system were in racially non-identifiable schools for part of a day and only 4.5 percent for
the full day” and “between 1967 and 1972, 90 percent of the students bused to relieve
overcrowding were black and were taken from largely black attendance areas in North St.
Louis to predominantly white schools in south St. Louis. However, no white students
were bused to predominately black schools when white schools became overcrowded.”184
The case was building showing that the SLPS had indeed acted in ways to support the
intentional and deliberate segregation of the races.
This renewed court battle highlighted for Judge Meredith the burden that had been
placed on African American students in SLPS. The plaintiffs “contend that between
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1954 and 1962 the School Board perpetuated racially segregated schools through its
power to draw attendance zones, grant transfers and make special assignments.”185
Additionally, “One problem the court must address is the scope of the violation,” argued
J. Gerald Hebert, attorney for the U.S. Department of Justice, another plaintiff in the
case. 186 The Consent Decree did not do enough to fix the scope of the problem, and
testimony against the district continued to build.
Another expert called to testify was David L. Colton, a Washington University
professor who served as the university’s director of the Center for Educational Field
Studies. 187 His testimony centered on the cost of desegregation plans and a study he had
completed for the Danforth Foundation. He testified that desegregation plans are “used
to influence policymakers and policy outcomes…defendants tend to exaggerate the
significance of costs…the financial plight of the schools is cited as a justification for
delay in implementation…on the other hand ‘plaintiffs try to minimize attention to costs,
asserting that cost considerations do not justify perpetuation of past unlawful
practices.’”188 While at one point Dr. Colton was a volunteer advisor for the Board of
Education, in his testimony he clearly favors the plaintiffs and shows that costs in other
districts held liable in crosstown busing desegregation decisions were manageable and
did not spell doom for the district. “He said estimates of the possible costs of large-scale
desegregation here, ranging up to $20 million, might be evidence that there was
overestimation of cost figures as a tactic here.”189 By throwing around such large
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numbers in testimony, the judge and others could be stunned into inaction on the issue of
integration.
Draft plans, revised and rewritten
As drafts of possible desegregation plans were brought to the Court by the Board
of Education, additional controversies emerged. Charles Burgess wrote, “A new
controversy over the alleged withholding of information by the St. Louis Board of
Education surfaced…This time the arguments centered on whether the final draft of an
alternative desegregation plan was provided in December to attorneys for various parties
in the case…it was not, according to testimony by Stephen M. Daeschner…director of
evaluation for the school system.” 190 Also highlighted in this article was that “Daeschner
emphasized that the proposals were prepared hastily in about seven days and that they
‘were only in draft form.’”191 The district rushed to design desegregation plans for the
court without prudently working through the finer details.
Other experts took a different approach in testimony, blaming the federal
government and housing practices for the issues of segregation facing the SLPS. Called
by the defendants, George D. Wendel, St. Louis University (SLU) professor and director
of SLU’s Center for Urban Programs, had a critical perspective for Judge Meredith. He
“testified in line with the board’s contention that continued segregated conditions in the
city schools have been caused by factors beyond the control of the school system.” 192
Wendel went on to say, “Financing, foreclosure and advertising practices in federal
housing programs ‘helped steer displaced black persons’ into older housing units
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throughout the West End and North St. Louis as whites left.” 193 His testimony supported
the Board of Education’s stance that they were not legally responsible for the segregation
of city schools and to deny the severity and scope of the harm to African American
children attending sub-par schools.
Pandering to white fragility and skittishness about integration
Dr. Wendel, in testimony before the Court, explained a 1977 study he authored
that showed “evidence that court-ordered desegregation may lead to whites abandoning
the public school system. That study’s, financed by the Danforth Foundation…principal
conclusion…was that desegregation plans…must encompass suburban as well as central
city students.”194 This explanation was the second half of the fear-mongering employed
as a tactic for the defense: to show that any desegregation plan would lead to further
white flight, in effect negating any efforts to integrate, therefore strongly suggesting that
desegregation plans be metro-wide in scope. Merging the city and county schools was
the most disturbing aspect of desegregation to the white community, representing an
affront to the security they paid for by moving to the county initially.
Further in his testimony, “Wendel expressed fear that such a [metro]
desegregation plan ‘might be hostile to good education’ and to neighborhood stability,
particularly in predominantly white South St. Louis.”195 This sort of fear mongering was
effective with white families in St. Louis, contributing to the growing hostile racial
environment around integration efforts. Busing had already been a lightning rod for fear;
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now there was a new threat to the sanctity of white schools, forcing the whites that fled
for the suburbs to integrate with the city students as well.
What the NAACP counsel Richard Fields was able to highlight from this study,
however, was the intentional selection of the neighborhood school concept to
subversively maintain the segregated system. Jon Sawyer reported, “Wendel attributed
the popularity of the neighborhood school concept in part to the fact that it presents an
acceptable ‘rationalization for opposing desegregation’…he [Wendel] conceded that
given present housing patterns the maintenance of neighborhood schools would have the
effect of freezing school populations on the basis of race.”196 The district used the
neighborhood concept within a segregated city, which in turn created segregated schools.
The district never looked back or considered another policy: this refusal to meaningfully
integrate the school system was the cornerstone of the case being made by the plaintiffs.
As testimony continued, the defense brought another witness, University of
Minnesota Professor Clifford P. Hooker, who claims, “the best scholarly analyses show
that massive desegregation plans accelerate white flight and cause very limited
improvement of black student achievement.”197 However, when questioned by plaintiff
counsel Richard Fields, Hooker “said that if the School Board is found guilty of violating
the constitutional rights of Black students, a judicial remedy must be imposed without
regard to speculation on the potential effects of any desegregation plan.” 198 If a
constitutional violation was found, it was clear even the defense’s experts knew that a
city or possibly metro-wide plan would be legally required and probably the best plan at
large-scale integration.
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According to The St. Louis Globe Democrat, Judge Meredith made it clear, “he
will not rule on a plan until he determines if there has been a violation of students’
constitutional rights.”199 There was not going to be a decision for several months, until
mid-summer.200
New Decision, Further Appeals, Long Awaited Implementation
Judge Meredith released his decision regarding the appeal to the 1975 Consent
Decree on April 12, 1979, “finding the St. Louis Board of Education not guilty of
intentional segregation.”201 By stating that he did not find a constitutional violation, he
effectively released the district and state from any wrongdoing, saying what they were
trying with the initial implementation of magnets showed good faith towards fixing the
school segregation problem. 202 Ms. Minnie Liddell called this “decision ‘a slap in the
face’ to education for Black students but said the ruling fits in well with the past negative
civil rights decisions coming out of Meredith’s Court”.203
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The St. Louis Argus was one major avenue for African Americans to voice their
concerns and the editorial cartoon on April 26, 1979 was one example of how this verdict
was seen.

Figure 1. St. Louis Argus Editorial Cartoon. April 26, 1979, 12.
Fortunately, the plaintiffs were not silenced with this decision and promptly filed
an appeal to the U.S. Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Although this appeal took almost
a year to decide, the Circuit Court overturned Judge Meredith’s decision in a monumental
victory for Black children in the city of St. Louis as it set a legal precedent for all other
challenges to come, requiring a system-wide remedy for a system-wide violation.204
Veronica Banks reported, “The appellate court reversed Meredith’s decision Monday and
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noted: ‘The district Court was clearly in error as to the constitutional requirement
imposed on defendants who have formerly discriminated to state law.’”205
Meredith’s Decision Overturned
The overturning of Meredith’s decision marked a turning point for the plaintiffs as
both the district and state were found to be in violation of the constitution and could no
longer escape responsibility for desegregating the public schools of St. Louis. This was a
major turning point in the Liddell litigation as being named as constitutional violators
meant both the district and state were now legally responsible for the remedy.
The St. Louis Argus ran several editorials in the March 6, 1980 edition celebrating
the decision and highlighting its importance for the readers of this weekly newspaper.
“This week’s Court of Appeals ruling, which found the public schools have deliberately
promoted racial segregation, is one of the most significant events in this city’s history.
Everyone is reacting to it, and there are disturbing comments about city-county busing,
‘white flight,’ and widespread defection to private schools.”206
The district was given 60 days to come up with a plan, involving some amount of
voluntary Inter-district transfers, which would be presented to Judge Meredith for
approval and implementation.207 Edward Foote, dean of the Washington University
School of Law, was appointed the chairman of the Citizen Advisory Committee, which
was responsible for gathering public input on a plan compiled by an internal
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Desegregation Committee of the SLPS Board of Education. 208 This plan would then be
sent to Judge Meredith for final approval. 209
Many parents and citizens were vocally opposed to parts of the plan, specifically
white parents on the south side of the city as well as those in the 24 county districts who
would be expected to participate in the voluntary transfer program.210 The St. Louis
Argus quoted several African American members of the Citizen’s Committee from a
public meeting, including former Board of Education president Anita Bond and
concerned citizen A. A. Albert, both of whom favored the metropolitan plan to bring true
integration to both the city and county systems. 211 Mr. Albert was a fixture at Board
meetings and was outspoken advocate for African American children. 212 The division
was very clear: white parents and majority white county districts did not want to be bused
or be required to participate in integrating schools versus Black families and activists
who saw busing as a necessary step towards integration, as long as white children were
expected to be bused too.
1980 Intracity Settlement Details
The 1980 Intracity Settlement was approved by the Board of Education on April
29, 1980 and called for busing of 4,400 white students and 3,200 Black students, with an
additional 3,400 Black students being bused to alleviate overcrowding and setting up the
‘feeder school concept’. In addition, the Board proposed the creation of four new magnet
schools while still leaving six city high schools with all-black enrollments.213 However,
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data reported by the St. Louis Argus showed a different picture, instead busing 1,067
Blacks and 1,035 whites alongside the creation of eight new magnet schools and five new
specialty programs.214 This discrepancy might be due to one source counting magnet
school students being bused with those being bused purely for integration efforts in
regular school environments.
While Unending Struggle explains that six high schools would be left untouched
by integration efforts, the St. Louis Argus is specific about the continued harm to black
students in non-integrated settings: “between 22,714 and 28,840 Black students would
remain in predominately Black schools, [Superintendent] Wentz admitted, but he said,
“This couldn’t be helped.”215 However, to be clear: the continuation of these
predominantly Black schools could not be helped with a remedy that only involved the
city school district. Without the involvement of the county districts and their large white
populations, the city district could never fully integrate a system that was 75:25 black to
white.
With such a high number of Black students not being reached with any integration
efforts, Veronica Banks explained in the St. Louis Argus, “Attorney Joseph
McDuffie…said that the plan had several weaknesses...‘as far as I’m concerned they have
not followed the direction of the suit as outlined by the Court of Appeals…This plan
holds no hope for the Blacks in the city, of ever having anything other than what they
were accustomed to.’”216 The Citizen’s Committee “remained resolute in its unanimous
calls for a metro-wide plan despite the other efforts they endorsed.”217
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By the end of the month of May 1980, Judge Meredith released his revised
version of the plan presented to him by SLPS Board. Ultimately, 7,000 students would
be bused for various reasons (magnet schools and integration efforts); the State of
Missouri was to pay half of the $22 million price tag; and the SLPS BoE, State,
Department of Justice, and the county school districts had until July 1 to develop a
voluntary pupil exchange plan.”218 Ms. Liddell was not happy with the plan, however,
stating, “This plan is totally unacceptable. It insures that the Black child will be once
again forgotten by the plan in years to come.’”219
Familiar Opposition Becomes Increasingly Vocal
As the summer of 1980 wore on, anti-plan vocalization continued from the St.
Louis Argus with an editorial by the publisher, Eugene N. Mitchell, stating,, “It was more
of a plea that an order, since nothing voluntary can be ordered, and the plea has fallen on
predictably deaf ears…Next year…there will be all-Black schools in St. Louis…and allwhite schools in Affton, Mehlville and Fairview. Integrated education, supposedly an
ideal goal, will continue to touch only a small minority of students.”220
By mid-June, eight county districts of 23 were receptive to a metro-level plan,
whereas the majority of others including Lindbergh, Ladue, Mehlville and AfftonBayless were publically opposed to supporting the cross-district parts of the plan. 221
Missouri, represented by Attorney General John D. Ashcroft, did not accept
responsibility for paying half of the bill and predictably filled suit albeit with severe
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public consternation from the SLPS BoE.222 This appeal was quickly litigated before and
denied by Judge Meredith July 29th, 1980.223 With little fanfare, school started about a
month after this appeal decision.. According to the St. Louis Argus, “A large percentage perhaps more than half – of the city’s Black students will attend segregated schools in
spite of the order. Complete integration was not possible…because Black pupils
constitute a 76 percent majority.” 224 Heaney and Uchitelle state, “Absenteeism appeared
to be the only expression of opposition. There were no organized boycotts, no protest
demonstrations, and no public displays of hostility.”225
Reporting on progress to Judge Meredith in November, Foote noted, “thousands
of Black pupils have been turned away from magnet school, while almost all white
students applying to such schools have been enrolled…ten of the 34 schools targeted for
integration remain outside the court’s guidelines with Black enrollment levels that are
higher than were planned.”226 The committee’s recommendations including making the
specialized programs available more broadly to Black students in non-integrated settings.
It became very clear that with a 75:25 ratio of Black to white students in the city, “any
attempts at meaningful integration were going to fall short without involving the
majority-white county districts.”227
In December 1980, Judge Meredith received a plan from the State of Missouri
that both the court expert, Dr. Gary Orfield, and plaintiff counsel, Joseph McDuffie, said
“provided no assurance of a significant increase in integration even if every suburban
district accepted its terms. In fact it specifically renounced the idea of any concrete
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desegregation goals.”228 Judge Meredith declared the plan submitted was insufficient and
gave a new deadline of February 2, 1981 for the State to submit a revised plan that would
provide more specifics about how many seats would be open for transfer to the county
among other demographic information about county districts. 229
When the St. Louis Argus pushed the U.S. Department of Justice for information,
they were met with silence, “I [Robert Reinstein, Special Assistant to the Director of the
Department of Justice, Civil Rights Division] can neither verify nor deny reports that the
U.S. Department of Justice is considering a metropolitan plan for city and county schools
in the St. Louis area…It is our official policy not to make statement unless a decision is
final and official.”230 In the same article, Ms. Banks reported that Judge Meredith had
resigned from the case due to health reasons, and Judge William L. Hungate would be
taking over supervising and litigating this contentious lawsuit.231
Judge Hungate takes over Liddell
Judge Hungate was appointed to oversee the Liddell case and while there was
some question about his qualifications and record as a legislator, ultimately no parties in
the Liddell suit appealed his ability to fairly adjudicate the case.232 He took a very hard
line approach to this case, having witnessed the obstructionism by the state, and he would
not allow the state to continue to delay the issue, in fact he issued a rebuke to the State of
Missouri on March 4, 1981 “for not having filed a voluntary city/suburban school
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desegregation plan within the sixty-day time limit set by Judge Meredith.”233 It was clear
he meant business and the State, county districts, and other parties in the suit needed to
get on board with developing a plan for the voluntary exchange of city/county students.
The state and Dr. Foote’s committee went back and forth developing a plan over
the next few months with Judge Hungate eventually approving a plan on July 2 nd, 1981
that covered “permissive interdistrict transfers, specialized magnet schools, and
educational programs designed to increase and promote constructive experiences for
students of different races…with the state paying the costs and expenses of the plan for
the first year.”234 As expected, the state filed an appeal, which was denied by the Eighth
Circuit Court, but by the end of July, only five county districts had signed on to the
plan.235 Judge Hungate then began legal proceedings against the 18 districts that did not
voluntarily sign on to participate. There were several months of back and forth, with
Attorney General Ashcroft again petitioning the Supreme Court and being continuously
denied. 236
Judge Hungate, in August 1982, issued an order declaring that if the remaining
recalcitrant districts didn’t get in line with the voluntary exchange, their districts would
be “abolished and a uniform tax rate would be applied with mandatory student
reassignments by race.”237 The parents in the majority-white districts were potentially
going to be forcibly pushed into becoming a part of the regional solution to integration.
Judge Hungate again used Dr. Foote and Bruce La Pierre (professor at Washington
University Law School) as special masters in the case to help broker a settlement between
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all the county districts and SLPS. Both the State and U.S. Department of Justice refused
to sign the agreement.238 Drs. Foote and La Pierre went back and forth between the 23
county districts and SLPS, eventually brokering a compromise and getting all parties to
participate in “the nation’s most extensive effort to integrate the schools of a major
metropolitan area” on June 1, 1983.239 This was seen as a tremendous accomplishment
yet represented a moment of intense interest convergence for the districts, as the
consequence of not agreeing to the settlement was prosecution.
Interest Convergence for the County Districts
The brokering of a Settlement of this size was only possible because Judge
Hungate had pushed the county districts into a corner. If they gambled and didn’t join
the Settlement Agreement, they would then be open to a lawsuit, which could be even
more detrimental to them because they did not know what the Judge could then order
them to do. This ruling represents another moment of interest convergence for the white
county districts. In the Settlement Agreement, they knew they would be getting a
specific number of city students (which was capped at 25%). They would also be getting
money from the State to “educate” these transfer students, and they would not be
responsible for the cost of transportation, nor would they be open to any further
litigation.240 If they didn’t sign on, the Judge could do any number of things to them and
they would not be in control of his decision the way they had been able to negotiate the
Settlement Agreement. Ultimately, they all took the known option, which carried a
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significant financial incentive and put the fears of a city-county school district merger to
rest.
Details of the 1983 Settlement Agreement
The Settlement agreed upon racial goals for the county districts of between 15%
and 25% minority enrollment, established the Voluntary Interdistrict Coordinating
Council (VICC) to supervise the transfer process, granted a financial benefit to the
receiving district for each city student they accepted, called for the creation of five new
magnet schools in the city (of which the state would pay half of the operating costs), and
established a 20:1 student: teacher ratio for the non-integrated city schools. 241 It also
included funds for “the city schools to get more nurses, counselors and social workers, as
well as funds so that principals could institute ‘school of emphasis’ programs” and
provisions for remedial programs (Saturday School, role-model programs).242
As expected, the State Attorney General, John Ashcroft, appealed the decision;
however, the Supreme Court did not take up his appeal. This final denial exhausted his
options for further appeals. The Eighth Circuit set up a Budget Review Committee
(BRC) to develop the financial strategy for the Settlement moving forward, and on
February 8, 1984 the Settlement Agreement that started in litigation in 1972 was finally
decided. 243
Later Decisions and Court
There were several judges that presided over the case from the first consent
decree in 1975 to the final settlement and phase out in 1999 and beyond. They were U.S.
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District Judge James H. Meredith, U.S. District Judge William L. Hungate, U.S. District
Judge Stephen N. Limbaugh, U.S. District Judge George F. Gunn Jr., and Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals Judge Gerald W. Heaney.
Judge Meredith
While he has received expansive explanation above, he deserves review here as
the initial judge to rule against any constitutional violation by the SLPS in the 1975
decision. After the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned his decision and returned
it to his court to preside over the resulting Consent Decree, he had to take a different
approach. Then, as litigation was getting active again with the addition of the NAACP
and the momentum leading to the 1980 Settlement Agreement, he experienced bad
health.
Judge Hungate
Judge Hungate also received introduction in the previous section, specifically as
related to the 1980 and 1983 Settlements. He was seen as a little bit of a livewire. The
lawyers never quite knew what to expect from him, and the county school districts felt a
certain amount of fear that he might mandate a city-county merger of schools and form a
metropolitan school district, united to educate all of the children in the regional St. Louis
area. This unpredictability served him well as it in some respects and helped get the
county districts to agree to the 1983 Settlement.
Judge Limbaugh
Judge Limbaugh presided through the 1980s over the Intra-city Plan and the
Settlement Agreement. He was one to carry a “big stick” and did not hesitate to show
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oppositional parties the broad and equitable powers of the District Court. An article in
the June 8, 1989 Post-Dispatch stated, “A federal judge threatened Wednesday to place
the SLPS administrators or even to put the school system into receivership because of
delays in implementing desegregation programs.”244 Also, the article reports, Judge
Limbaugh reminds all readers of the federal court’s power by stating that no conditional
use permits would be needed by the SLPS to complete construction required by the
desegregation program. 245 He was using his broad and equitable powers to override city
permit policy in an attempt to get the magnet school construction moving faster. In
Order L(2468)89, he minces no words: “This Court has already made one finding of
contempt by the City Board. If the Court finds evidence substantiating further acts of
contempt…the Court will not hesitate in replacing key administrative personnel with
persons more receptive to court supervision.” 246 Judge Limbaugh was transferred off the
Liddell case on September 4, 1991 and Judge Gunn took over at that date.247
Judge Gunn
Judge Gunn exercised his power primarily in the implementation of the Capital
Improvements Order. In one example of the power he exercised, he forced the SLPS to
buy a very specific piece of land that would later become the new magnet school for
investigative learning, currently named Compton-Drew Investigative Learning Center.
Although the district had plans and litigation pending to purchase other land around the
St. Louis Science Center, Judge Gunn wanted the school as close as possible and forced
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the SLPS to purchase two different tracks of land.248 He is also the judge that presided
over the construction of the Gateway Elementary and Middle School complex on the site
of the former Pruit Igoe housing projects, one of the other major new construction
projects of the Capital Improvement Plan. Additionally, he was the judge that presided
over the unitary status hearings of the mid to late 1990s, eventually ruling on a decision
to phase out the state payments for the magnet and non-integrated schools.
Judge Heaney
Judge Heaney served on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and over a period of
eighteen years wrote over two dozen opinions in the Liddell case starting in 1981. 249 He
was appointed to the Appeals Court in 1966 by President Lyndon B. Johnson and wrote
opinions that included strategies for integration in St. Louis.250 He co-authored one of the
most well-known books on St. Louis desegregation efforts titled, Unending Struggle.251
Committees Set Up by the Court
Before a deeper analysis of policy can begin, it is important to introduce to the
reader the various committees appointed by the court over the years to monitor, evaluate,
and recommend policy for the desegregation of the St. Louis Public Schools. This
section highlights the major policy influencers while explaining whom they were fighting
for since they each had a special interest that they were protecting and advocating for
throughout their tenure. Not all of the specific committee members are reviewed but
remain a point for further exploration and research, especially given the tremendous
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influence they had shaping local desegregation policy. Some of the major players are
named as deemed important by this author.
Desegregation Monitoring Committee (DMC)
Dr. Edward Foote was the chairman and was tasked with developing a voluntary
transfer plan by Judge Hungate.252 He was routinely used to report to the court as an
expert on the SLPS desegregation plans.
Magnet Review Committee (MRC)
Dr. Tracy Libros served as the director of the Magnet Review Committee, and she
felt that magnet schools had an important role to play in the desegregation plan, thus
hijacking of the plight of the plaintiffs in the original case. 253 The mindset that magnet
schools were the panacea of addressing the wrongs of a segregated school system was
perpetuated by the work of this committee and others like it. One task it was responsible
for was evaluating each magnet school bi-annually.254 As explain in Unending Struggle,
“On May 14, 1987, Judge Limbaugh relieved the existing Magnet Review Committee of
its responsibilities and appointed a panel of three nationally known educators to develop
a long-range plan for the magnet schools in St. Louis.” 255

Magnet Review Panel (MRP)
This group consisted of three education experts, Charles V. Willie (professor of
education at Harvard), Eugene Reville (superintendent of Buffalo, New York), and John
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A. Murphy (superintendent of Prince George County Public Schools, Maryland). 256 They
were appointed by Judge Limbaugh as a way to break through the logjam that the MRC
was facing. They were all outsiders, so they did not have any local ties influencing them
any particular way. They were responsible for authoring the Long-Range Comprehensive
Plan For the Magnet Schools of St. Louis, Missouri, which was ordered by Judge
Limbaugh in L(1436)87.257
Budget Review Committee (BRC)
Originally set up by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in response to a state
appeal of Judge Hungate’s original Settlement Agreement in 1983, it was tasked with
monitoring the flow of funds for magnet schools, transfer of pupils, and the remedial
programs that would be created in the SLPS district.
Desegregation Monitoring Advisory Committee (DMAC)
This committee existed throughout the 1980s and primarily focused on
monitoring the magnet schools. It was also responsible for monitoring all of the
specialized programs through the B-Components of the NIS. Both DMAC and
Committee on Quality Education were part of the Intra-city Settlement Plan of 1980.258
Committee on Quality Education (CQE)
Without a doubt, this committee was the first and most vocal champion of the
non-integrated schools. No other entity fought as hard to ensure that the children in NIS
would not be left behind and that the part of the desegregation agreement having to do
256
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with their protection would not be forgotten as magnet schools received more and more
attention and funding. As an example, Faith A. Sandler wrote in Metropolitan
Education, “of the black students attending school within the city of St. Louis during the
past academic year [1985-1986], 67 percent attended NIS…57 percent of the black public
school students from the city attended school in non-integrated settings.”259 This
committee consistently highlighted gaps in spending, and Ms. Sandler wrote, “In 198485, the spending level for all provision of the Settlement Agreement was 86 percent. For
provisions for NIS only, the spending rate was 53 percent…three of the eleven special
provision of the Settlement Agreement for NIS have, as of fall 1986, been
unimplemented: After school classes, Saturday classes, and the Motivational
Experiences Program.”260
A brief filed by the CQE stated, "In addition, the Court has likened the role of the
Committee to that of a ‘watchdog’ for the interests of students attending all-black
schools." 261 The members of the CQE knew they were speaking up for those students
who were truly left behind and took this responsibility seriously, naming for the Court
time and time again the discrepancies they saw in the implementation of the Court’s
orders.
Education Monitoring Advisory Committee (EMAC)
EMAC took over for the CQE in the early 1990s. It served the same purpose: to
be a watchdog for the NIS and ensure that the best interest of the students in those
schools was being promoted in desegregation litigation.
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Voluntary Interdistrict Coordinating Committee (VICC)
VICC was established in the 1983 Settlement Agreement to monitor and
coordinate the student exchanges between the city and county districts. It included
representatives from the State Department of Education, all school districts involved in
the Settlement, and a member representing the NAACP and Liddell plaintiff group. 262
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Chapter Five: African American Reactions and Reservations to Desegregation Plans
What Agency and Community in Desegregation Efforts?
As early as 1970, in an article describing the loss of integration in schools, the
superintendent of SLPS William Kottmeyer was quoted as saying, “It [busing] creates
distance and remoteness. It causes further breakdown between the home and school, and
until an intimate relationship there is re-established, everything else will be artificial
whistling in the wind.”263 Is he defending a district that is desperately trying not to
alienate its white constituents, or is he trying to preserve agency and community in
African American neighborhoods on the north side of the city? While we may never
know his intent, as policy was enacted over the following 40 years based on his position,
one thing was clear: dividing up schools in the north side was never given a second
thought as communities were chopped up as necessary.
A few years after this article was published, at the outset of the consent decree
made in December of 1975, Minnie Liddell was extremely excited at the prospects of her
organization having a voice in the plans for integration. As quoted in the GlobeDemocrat by Kathryn Waters, Minnie stated:
We want the plan to be one that comes from the total community, and
that’s why we agreed to only general language. There’s nothing that ties you
down to what eventually might take place…We wanted them [the board] first to
admit the schools were segregated and commit themselves to doing something
about that. We wanted to handle it in two phases – initially a consent judgment,
and then we’ll get busy with a plan that has total involvement of the
community…this is what has been wrong in some other areas. A bunch of
experts have come in and decided what would be good. That’s why we refused to
put this ball game together at once.264
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While her enthusiasm is inspiring, it is clear Ms. Liddell knew even at that early date in
the bigger picture of the Liddell suit that they were up against quite a monster, fighting
the system to do right by the children of the African American neighborhoods of St.
Louis.
The involvement of the community was required in the 1975 Consent Decree and
also in the different proposals to the judge, but how much community input was actually
present in the final drafts of the plan? While the Concerned Parents of North St. Louis
initially endorsed the 1975 Consent Decree, as they witnessed the implementation over
the first few years, they grew increasingly dissatisfied. Sheila Rule reported in the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, “Mrs. Minnie Liddell…called the proposed plan [for integrated
junior high schools] ‘totally inadequate.’ ‘The plan is totally inadequate because it deals
with such a small number of students…I understand better ideas were submitted to the
board but the board completely ignored those sources.”265 The district struggled with
meaningful desegregation in light of the radical imbalance in racial composition of the
student body of the city.
Voices of Opposition
Throughout the litigation of the Liddell case, the Citizens’ Advisory Board
continued to be largely ignored by the Board of Education. Regarding the initial magnet
school implementation, this organization expressed concerns about the newly created
magnet school entrance requirements that required students to interview and present
portfolios of artistic talent. “The Citizens’ Committee, set up to review all magnet
programs, has expressed its dissatisfaction of the district’s second proposal which was
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submitted without consultation with the committee, members said.” 266 They knew their
children wouldn’t have a fair shot at gaining entrance to schools with demanding
entrance requirements, but in order to convince the white families of the city the magnet
schools were something “elite,” these requirements were instituted anyway.
After the 1980 Intracity Decision, the Black parents and Citizen’s Committee
members again expressed concern with how inadequate the new plan was at integrating
the majority of Black children in SLPS and the large number that would still remain in
non-integrated school settings. While the plan was being debated, a member of the
committee, Mattie Devine stated, “’Several parents have expressed concern that the
clustering of the schools in north St. Louis has placed this double burden on the students
because they are bused and a segregated system is still maintained in many schools
facilities.’”267 The plaintiffs were again not happy with the plan because it did not
provide substantial relief from the segregation that would inevitably continue. However,
who was listening to them? Who cared to hear their cries?
According to an editorial run in the St. Louis Argus after the 1980 Intracity
Settlement was finalized and sent to Judge Meredith, “Nearly half of the Black students
in the public schools of St. Louis will be attending segregated schools next year…we are
worried, however, about Cleveland and Roosevelt. These schools, with long-standing
white traditions, could become the arenas where the city’s fears and prejudices will clash.
Black students in these schools will be a good way from home.” 268 The Black citizens
and committee members watching this litigation unfold knew that their children were
being sent into hostile environments far away from their homes and were not hopeful
Kathy Rogers, “First come-first serve basis for magnet school admission,” St. Louis Argus. July 8, 1976, 2.
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things would go peacefully. How could this seem like an improvement to them? How
did this decision hold their best interest as a core belief?
School Location Racism
One hurdle for any efforts at meaningful integration involved the physical
location of the schools to be integrated. As the St. Louis Board of Education Citizens’
Advisory Committee met to determine the location of the original five magnet schools
(called for in the 1975 Consent Decree), they encountered opposition to locating those
schools in the northwest area of the city. 269 Mrs. Liddell said, “The school board’s
magnet school plan favors students living in South St. Louis and ignores the
northwest.”270 While people on the committee recognized that the north side schools
were indeed incredibly overcrowded and were initially told magnet schools could be
located anywhere in the city, when put to a vote, those north and northwest locations
were seen at unfeasible and were voted down in favor of central or south side locations.
In the first school year of the consent decree, 1976-1977, several magnet schools
were having trouble recruiting white students. Even before the school year started, the
programs were significantly under-enrolled compared to the number of white students
anticipated and legally needed to fill the racial quotas set by the Court. About a month
before the 1976-77 school year began, the magnet schools were short 1,000 white
students for all levels of programs. 271 This fact caused a certain amount of panic by the
BoE because if the racial balance of 50:50, with variance of 60:40 allowed was not met,
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the federal magnet funds would be withheld, leaving the district in a very difficult
financial situation.
A little over a month into the first semester, the situation at the magnet schools
located on the north side was dire. Writing in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Victor
Volland reported, “Overall black enrollment was 55.6 per cent, although in two
elementary schools on the predominately black North Side white enrollment was under
10 per cent…many schools, particularly those on the North Side, have had difficulty
attracting white students.”272 The departure from the expected racial ratios threatened to
lead to a loss in federal funding: “Several magnet schools in St. Louis are in danger of
losing federal aid because the have attracted too few white students to meet federal civil
rights guidelines…last year, the school system lost about $80,000 in federal aid for the
Academy of Basic Instruction because there were only six white students among 120
students in grades one through eight.”273
Unfortunately, in the third school year of the magnet school plan, 1978-1979, the
situation had not improved, with several magnet schools still majority black and
exceeding the ratio set by the Court. The St. Louis American reported, “The schools that
are further south are the ones at which the racial ratio is closer to the 50:50, Minnie
Liddell…said…Some whites do not feel comfortable sending their children into black
neighborhoods on the north side, she said. The program doesn’t affect enough
students…it only involves about 10 percent of the entire student population.”274
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There was not much more the district could do to convince white parents to send
their children to school on the north side, as the deeply-seeded racist fear of the Black
neighborhood whites held was too great to be overcome by the promise of a specialized
school. This fear came up throughout the litigation of Liddell, and it was prominently
seen again when the majority-white county districts were grappling with the possible
merger with the city district in the litigation of the 1983 Settlement Agreement. White
parents were not willing to compromise what they viewed as their child’s safety for the
promise of a more elite education offered by a magnet school.
This fear explains why so few white county students came into the city when the
interdistrict transfers started after the 1983 Settlement. White parents would simply not
compromise what they saw as the safety of their children whereas Black parents, without
widespread access to quality schools, did choose to send their children into potentially
hostile environments in the hope the new school would be better than the current one.
Black parents valued access to a potentially higher quality school over the risk of sending
their child to a majority-white environment.
Neighborhood Schools Shifting for 20:1 Ratio
The SLPS district struggled to reduce the class size in the non-integrated schools
(NIS), specifically on the north side of the city. While some students were supposed to
be transferring out to the county as one relief for overcrowding, in addition to some
attending magnet schools, there simply was not enough room at the NIS by any stretch of
the imagination. The magnet schools were being held to strict court-mandated racial
quotas, and, despite the interest of Black families, there was more demand than seats
available. From the BoE Report on Class Size Reduction,
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Achieving a maximum class size of 20:1 in the NIS elementary and middle
schools by re-assigning students would require the reassignment of over 20,000
students. In addition, operating costs would increase by almost $11 million and
capital expenditures by over $100 million. These costs are in addition to the $1.1
million increase required to implement the Board's 1987-1988 Student
Reassignment Plan, which would provide an average class size of 24:1 in the NI
and magnet element and MS. 275
The Board was up against an impossible task and, unfortunately, did not see success in
this area of the Settlements.
Overcrowding and How it was Litigated
There were times during the many years of Court monitoring that the SLPS Board
of Education filed briefs that were strongly opposed to the recommendations of the
various committees and panels. Specifically, when discussing grade-level changes, the
district occasionally held firm on what schools to shift or grades to move based on what it
would do to the children and neighborhoods impacted.
It was well established that in the fall of 1988, the NIS were overcrowded; the
Capital Improvement Plan had recently been ordered; and the district was still facing
overcrowding in the NIS with no relief in immediate sight. A memo from Glen
Campbell, Executive Director of the Desegregation Monitoring Office, to Jerome Jones,
Superintendent, on December 9, 1988 details this overcrowding:
10 NI elementary schools have school-wide average pupil-teacher ratios in grades
of 21:1 or higher…13 of 41 NI elementary schools have no classrooms in excess
of 21 students…9 schools have 3 or fewer graded classrooms in excess of 21
students…13 schools have from four to nine graded classrooms with more than 21
students…A review of the construction schedule for the chronically overcrowded
schools discloses that none is scheduled for completion of work that would yield
additional classroom space by the start of the 89/90 SY (p.2)…Any other work
would not be completed on the schools most critically in need of space until 19911992. 276
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Mr. Campbell knew the Committee on Quality Education (CQE) would be entering a
proposal to the Court because there was no relief for students in the NIS coming any time
in the near future. This chronic overcrowding was one of the most significant harms
being experienced by the plaintiffs at the time the Liddell case started in 1972, and here
in 1988 it continued to be an issue for which no party had an immediate solution that both
preserved neighborhoods and led to a minimal amount of disruption for the children.
The CQE Report L(2242)88 wanted the district to move fifth graders attending
identified overcrowded non-integrated elementary schools to middle schools that they
would normally flow into and proposed doing this on a block-by-block basis so that all
students would have consistency, essentially getting them to middle school early. The
problem arose in that the CQE was proposing this change in the middle of the school year
as a relief to overcrowding that had been exposed to the Court in the fall after student
enrollments were analyzed. It would send the teachers and their entire classes to new
schools, but it couldn’t guarantee that the students would truly be going to the middle
school they would normally attend as a sixth grader, since all were mixed in classes at the
elementary level without regard to future middle school assignment.
The district knew this move would be incredibly harmful to the students, the staff,
and ultimately the neighborhood. Shifting students for one semester to when they would
possibly matriculate to another middle school in the fall was simply not acceptable.
Additionally, the district had specifically created middle schools for sixth through eighth
graders, and the thought of putting fifth graders into that middle-school environment was
not sound educational practice. Would this “early maturing” of fifth graders have
happened in a predominantly white school district?
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The district filed a response, L(2260)89, which stated, "The CQE proposal has not
been endorsed by any party and the BOE does not recommend that the proposal be
approved by the Court. Due to the disadvantages noted above, the Board would prefer
not to implement the CQE proposal at this time.” 277 The Board was specific in its
response that the CQE proposal would be exceptionally harmful to students and teachers.
Magnet Policies that Kept Black Children Out
Whether it was testing for access to gifted classrooms, size requirements for
Naval uniforms, or even prior educational experience with the Montessori program
offered only in the magnet schools, African American students faced additional barriers
to enrolling in the magnet schools. Two of these policies are highlighted. Gifted
education was intentionally omitted because it requires significant further study, and, for
the purposes of this dissertation, it was not highlighted.
NJROTC Size Requirements
At Cleveland NJROTC High School, students are required to wear a naval
uniform every day as part of the specialized program. Unfortunately, at the start of the
1987-88 school year, three students were admitted to NJROTC who couldn’t fit into the
standard size uniform. Glen Campbell sent a memo to Jerome Jones about this situation,
letting him know what steps his department, the Desegregation Monitoring Office, was
going to take to alleviate this from happening again.
Mr. Campbell explained, “For the first time, to our knowledge, applicants for
Cleveland NJROTC have been accepted through the Magnet School Reservation System
this year but have been rejected at the school because their uniform size requirements
277
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exceeded the largest sizes available…We have learned that students are required to wear
the standard Navy issue uniform and that the largest sizes issued are 22 for females and
46 (slacks) and 50 (coat) for males…Unless there is another way around the problem, we
should indicate size limitations in recruitment material for the NJROTC.” 278
Montessori Programs
Montessori is a unique instructional method that engages students in a nontraditional way. It is a much more relaxed way of learning and is constructivist in nature.
Unfortunately, in a memo from Glen Campbell to Gene Uram, he explains, “We should
also revise Montessori brochures and recruitment information so that parents are aware
that students may not be admitted above the kindergarten level if they have not had prior
Montessori training.”279
Advocacy for NIS to the Courts
As mentioned previously, the Committee on Quality Education (CQE) was one of
the strongest advocates for supporting the non-integrated schools (NIS). This committee
knew that magnet schools were not going to solve the large problems for African
American children in the district, and the committee continued pushing for the
improvement of the NIS. From L(2130)88, the CQE gave this response to the DMAC
Student Assignment Report L(2120)88:
As we wait for the level of integration to increase, thousands of students are
passing through non-integrated schools. Whether 20 or 22,000 students attend
all-black schools, both the district and the Appellate Court have ordered that full
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implementation of compensatory programs and improvements in educational
quality be provided to these students.280
The CQE continued pushing for the necessary capital improvements and programs for the
NIS but were mostly unsuccessful.
BoE Pushing Back Against Court Release of Monitoring
The Board of Education was clearly aware of its shortcomings in providing a
quality education for the children of the district, specifically African American children
who were left in the NISs because there were simply not enough seats in the magnets. It
is especially painful given the number of vacancies that existed in the magnet schools for
white students. An August 14, 1995 BoE Desegregation Report and Policy Statement
read:
It has been conclusively demonstrated that there are not enough magnet school
seats at the pre-school and elementary levels (B-3, 4)…The complex system of
priorities required by the Magnet Plan has resulted in unfairness, unintended
consequences and a widespread perception of unequal treatment (B-5)…Several
aspects of desegregation in St. Louis have not been fully implemented. Thus, the
BoE and the State of Missouri have not met a threshold requirement for release
from judicial supervision: full implementation for a reasonable period of time.
Moreover, the effectiveness of several significant aspects of the desegregation
remedies has not been adequately assessed (A-4)…The quality education
programs in City schools have also not been proven effective to the extent
practicable (A-5)…The Board will work to maintain and expand its successful
system of magnet schools. Magnets have received broad approval and support
from parents, students, community groups, interested citizens, cultural
institutions, businesses and others in the St. Louis area. The long waiting lists
continue to attest to the popularity of the magnet schools (B-3)…There are often
thousands of black city students who wish to enroll in magnets, but who cannot be
admitted because of a lack of a sufficient number of white students to racially
balance the schools in accordance with the present guidelines. In a number of
instances where black City students are denied admission because of racial
balance, there are in fact many vacant seats available in the very schools for
which the students have applied (B-6). [emphasis added]281
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As this extended segment from the BoE policy statement shows, by 1995, the
district was well aware of its shortcomings for its African American students and its
unfairness to Black children in the magnet quotas. The BoE knew the policy was
impacting Black children in negative ways yet did not seem to know how to approach
equalizing this inequity.
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Chapter Six: The Non-Integrated Schools
The Children Left Behind
For all the attention given to the magnet schools, what is most appalling about the
legacy of Liddell litigation is that the large majority of African American students in
SLPS did not have access to these elite schools. The 1975 Consent Decree and
Settlements (1980, 1983) minimally acknowledged this discrepancy with provisions to
ensure that the non-integrated schools (NIS) received supports, but unfortunately these
supports were insufficient in remedying the harm caused by many years of segregation.
20:1 Pupil: Teacher Ratio
One of the main provisions outside of the magnet school remedies, first written in
the 1980 Settlement, was the establishment of a 20:1 pupil-teacher ratio across all of the
NIS. This provision provided an easy data point by which the Court and various
committees could monitor and measure success or failure throughout the tenure of the
Liddell suit. Because the persistently overcrowded schools on the city’s north side were
part of the harm, the 20:1 ratio gave what the Court saw as an easy fix to this harm
experienced by the plaintiffs.
The monitoring of class size was a major focus of the superintendent, Jerome
Jones, and the Executive Director of the Desegregation Monitoring Office, Glen
Campbell. Their focus on system-wide monitoring is evident in this example, also
highlighted in the previous chapter, from a memo sent from Campbell to Jones on
December 9, 1988. Campbell writes:
10 NI elementary schools have school-wide average pupil-teacher ratios in grades
of 21:1 or higher…13/41 NI elementary have no classrooms in excess of 21
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students…9 schools have 3 or fewer graded classrooms in excess of 21
students…13 schools have from four to nine graded classrooms with more than 21
students…A review of the construction schedule for the chronically overcrowded
schools discloses that none is scheduled for completion of work that would yield
additional classroom space by the start of the 89/90 SY (p.2)…Any other work
would not be completed on the schools most critically in need of space until 19911992.282
Campbell and Jones were up against a wall: they knew that they would be found in
contempt of court, yet they did not have many options for alleviating the chronic
overcrowding on the north side of the city.
Schools of Emphasis
Schools of Emphasis (SoE) were part of the original 1975 Consent Decree and
followed in the 1980 and 1983 Settlements as well as a program that would remain in the
NIS in an attempt to provide a “better” education in that environment. Unfortunately, the
budgets were cut annually, and principals and district officials struggled to spend all of
the money allocated, partially due to the district struggling to fund their part of the
program. What principals could actually purchase with SoE monies was difficult to
discern and confusing for principals to navigate. This fact caused them to chronically
underspend the allotted amount, which then gave the Courts and Committees reasons to
reduce the funding every subsequent year. Couple that annual challenge with the
turnover principals faced every year, and it is no wonder the schools struggled to
maintain programs and spend their budgets. No one appeared to know what they were
doing, and there was not long term stability for this program. From the SLPS Division of
Evaluation and Research SoE Follow Up Report:
SLPS guidelines stated that SoE programs should not provide remediation,
duplicate existing Board requirements, or focus on areas already receiving
282
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sufficient curricular attention" (p.2)…During the first year of program operations
(1984-1985) the SoE budget was $1.57 million…the budget for the 1988-1989 SY
was $647,503 or $10,800 per NIS. Of the $4.1 million allocated for SoE during
its first three years (FY 85-87), SLPS only spent 51%. (p. 4)283
Even when principals were able to gain some autonomy and make decisions about how to
spend the SoE money, they were met with a court system that would deny requests in
arbitrary ways. From the SLPS Division of Evaluation and Research document titled
Guidelines for SoE Programs:
During the 90-91 SY, each grade level of schools will receive the same proportion
of the overall SOE budget as it received during the 89-90 SY. Subsequent to the
90-91 SY, the superintendent or his designee will determine the overall
allocations for each grade level of schools. (p.2)
The Guidelines go on:
Principals are advised, however, that the State of Missouri has sometimes
objected to funding in-service training and equipment. Requests in these areas
must be supported by clear statements as to why such expenditures are necessary.
(p.3)284
Thus, principals supervising a school with a SoE program were required to supply
the Court with extra justification to use money for teacher professional development,
known as in-service training, presenting principals with yet another barrier for using
funds. Probably one of the most important items a principal could spend money on,
training teachers in the SoE model and how to effectively implement it, was something
the district knew the state would fight and in effect advised them against allocating funds
in that way. This problem shows the larger disconnect between the policy set by the
Court and committees and the reality of running an effective school-based program.
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MERRY (incentives to attend school)
The Motivation and Recognition program started in school year 1987-88 at eleven
schools, expanding to 34 schools by school year 1988-89 with an annual budget of
$20,000.285 The funds were used to cover travel to district math and science
competitions. For SY 88/89, only 63% of the MERRY budget went directly to schools,
with high schools receiving $500 and middle/elementary schools receiving $300. 286
However, only 58% of NIS received funds in SY 88/89, a total of 34 schools, while 57%
of NI elementary schools did not see any funds and the total 88/89 budget left 17%
unencumbered. 287 While it was a program that saw a lot of traction with a minimal
budget, the mindset that any money must be helpful to the NIS was pervasive in the
writing of the Division of Evaluation and Research. From the report,
MERRY also helped 633 students in interscholastic events. While cost effective,
MERRY's $20,000 budget appears unable to serve all non-integrated schools;
fewer than 50% of elementary pupils were reached. Late budget approval by the
court (fall 1988) postponed implementation; State intervention with funds (spring
1989) delayed allocation to schools. These problems together with SLPS delays
in processing some expenditures resulted in about 17% of MERRY's 1988-189
budget remaining unencumbered. (p. 11)
The report goes on,
MERRY is a useful motivation/recognition program designed for disadvantaged
students in the non-integrated schools. At very low cost, the program is reaching
a large number of students, and this formative evaluation shows that MERRY
should receive continued support...During pilot implementation MERRY has
been...funded so that meaningful appropriations could not be made to all nonintegrated schools and at the same time be applied to district wide interscholastic
activities...unable to provide appropriations to all non-integrated elementary
schools…Nonetheless, other findings indicate program strengths which clearly
outweigh start-up problems. MERRY is...cost-effective and beneficial within a
minimal budget. 288
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Possibly because it was seen to have a broad impact for a seemingly small amount
of funds, in July of 1989, Maritz Inc. pledged to support the program of increasing
attendance in the NIS, scheduling this program to go into effect across the district the
start of the next school year, September, 1989.
This author has a specific critique of MERRY dealing with the travel to district
math and science competitions. If the district sponsors a competition for students, why
would the district not spend the money to ensure that all schools have a chance to attend?
Why was this program necessary to ensure participation of NIS in district competitions?
Additionally, the impact of MERRY is slightly exaggerated because while every student
attending a MERRY school is counted in the SLPS Division of Research and Evaluation
as a receiver of funds, not every child is being recognized by incentives for good
attendance or participation in the math contest, as examples.
Other Supplemental Programs
In the early days of the 1983 Settlement Agreement, there were three main
supplemental programs used by both integrated and non-integrated schools. They were
School Partnership, Pairing and Sharing, and Springboard to Learning.

According to the SLPS BoE Information Report on the Distribution of Services:
Intracity Deseg Plan funding for services for three supplemental programs
(School Partnership, Pairing and Sharing, Springboard to Learning)…Previous
research showed unevenness in implementation of School Partnership Program,
which was the result of ‘natural factors.’ Pairing and Sharing includes guided
field trips that bring together black/white children, take children to
cultural/historical sites for 2 hour - half day experiences. School Partnership
provides a variety of classroom/school programs sponsored by business, cultural,
and government institutions. They typically consist of 6 weekly sessions lasting 1
hour, 525 programs in over 110 schools in 83/84 SY. Springboard to Learning is
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weekly classroom programs lasting a semester with an international studies
focus. 289
Unfortunately, these programs were not implemented evenly in Integrated/NonIntegrated schools. From the same report:
When services from all three supplemental programs are taken together, there is a
small difference in average service units per student favoring regular integrated
schools. Also students in non-integrated schools did spend somewhat less time in
programs than did their counterparts in integrated or magnet schools.290
Students in NIS were receiving less of the specialized support that was designed to be
providing them the direct remedy for being in a non-integrated space: yet another
example of how students in NIS were continuously left behind throughout the litigation
and implementation of the Liddell case.
Libraries, Nurses, Social Workers
One part of the initial remedy was to ensure that all NIS had functioning libraries,
nurses, and social workers, yet throughout implementation, the watchdog committees
found that these services were not present nor up to suitable standards. EMAC Report
G(574)92, contained nine recommendations for change in addition to highlighting the
fact that libraries were not functioning at Early Childhood Education Center III, Cook,
Ford, Hickey, Sherman and Sigel elementary schools at the time of the EMAC visit. 291
This report represents just one example of the highlighting of ongoing issues around
implementation of NIS programs.
Remedial Need is Unmet
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It should not be surprising that analysis of the remedial opportunities available to
students in NIS shows that students attending those schools did not have full access to the
relief provided by the Court for them. From CQE Report L(1469)87, table six shows that
for elementary and middle school children, remedial need is met for 4% of students
through the Intracity plan, 14% through the Settlement Agreement of 1983, 37% through
Chapter I (now called Title I), resulting in 45% of identified student needs unmet by any
of the Court orders.292 Students were classified as needing services based on a score
below the national mean on the C.A.T in spring of 1986. What this table shows is the
very low proportion of students receiving aid from either of the Settlement Agreements.
CQE Report L(1469)87 goes on to explain,
The Settlement Agreement divided the "B components" for NIS into two major
categories: instructional programs and motivational programs. The specific
instructional provisions for NIS had as their cornerstone further reductions in
pupil-teacher ratios and after-school, Saturday, and summer school experiences.
(p.4) 293
It continues,
Students attending NIS have the right, under the law, to additional compensatory
services and programs. If additional remedial needs exist, then it is the
responsibility of all parties and committees to find ways to meet these needs
without further jeopardizing students who are already the victims of racial
injustice. We will not solve the problem by ignoring it or contending that it does
not exist. (p.6) 294
The CQE consistently raised the same concerns for the Court; however, the Court, BOE
and State were slow to generate meaningful policy that effectively addressed the
committee’s concerns.
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The Physical State of the NIS
While the general physical conditions of the district’s schools were widely known
to be deplorable, the main issue the Court chose to focus on was the overcrowding, with a
goal to getting the NIS to achieve the 20:1 pupil/teacher ratio in all schools. The Capital
Improvement Order was very specific in calling for the renovation of 105 schools across
all school types: magnet, integrated, and non-integrated.295 However, the relief for
overcrowding and poor conditions was to be provided to the NIS first. There were
several pieces of litigation around how the district was prioritizing the NIS, and the
Board provided analysis using the term “construction month” to show how the NIS were
indeed receiving the majority of time and work on building improvements. 296
The CQE found in L(2251)88 that the district was properly prioritizing the NIS
elementary schools that were most in violation of the 20:1 ratio in the first two years of
construction:
[T]he construction schedules set forth by the Board in L(2222)88 do indicate that
some priority is placed upon renovation at NIS…It is unfortunate that a contempt
citation in late August, 1988 was required before such a priority could be
recognized in the construction schedules. While 15 months have passed since the
capital order was issued, there has yet to be any interior renovations, gymnasiums
or classroom additions begun at NIS in desperate need of added capacity. While
this delay carries certain costs to students attending NIS, the schedules now filed
by the Board indicate that priorities have shifted toward construction at NIS. 297
The state continued to insist that the district was mishandling the Capital Improvements
Order so much so that the Court had to step in to tell the State to stand down from further
legal proceedings on this matter. In Memorandum and Order L(2311)89 Judge
Limbaugh states,
295
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The Court finds no violation of its directives, and the construction schedule to be
in compliance with both the spirit and intent of this Court’s orders…the State is
mistaken in its belief that the Court ordered all renovation work completed and
the NIS before any work began at integrated schools and/or magnets…as a final
note, the Court is disturbed by the caliber of the State’s motion. The contents
were essentially a collection of factual inaccuracies, statistical distortions, and
insipid remarks regarding the Court’s handling of this case…the State in its
wisdom shall desist in filing further motions grounded in rumor and
unsubstantiated allegations of wrongdoing. 298
Judge Limbaugh acknowledged that the district was attempting to give priority and
explained that the state needed to stand down on the aggressive tone taken throughout the
fillings.
Funding Deficiencies
Time and time again over the course of the Settlements, the Committee on Quality
Education highlighted places where NIS students were not receiving the proper levels of
financial support as written into the Court Orders.
Schools of Emphasis
One example was in the annual funding and spending for Schools of Emphasis. From
CQE Report L(1468)87,
Implementation is 'scattered and imbalanced'…In the 86/87 school year, 24,000
black children attended NIS. As one of the most far-reaching enrichment
provisions for all-black schools, this program is of vital importance in achieving a
fully implemented and equitable remedy (p.6)…Since this program began, the
School of Emphasis program has experienced a funding decrease of 43 percent (p.
15)…The High School budget spent 26% in fiscal year 1985 and 42% in fiscal
year 1986 (p 16)…There is wide variance in what schools receive and how they
spend it on their students…huge discrepancies between elementary, middle and
high school percentage expended as well…Four types of categories existed for
SoE Themes, specialized content area, basic skills enhancement, social skills, and
specialized instructional technique (p.29)…Of all the school types, high schools
grossly underspent their budgets, fiscal year 1985 they only spent 26% and in
fiscal year 1986 only spend 42%.299
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The CQE was very specific and did not mince words when highlighting where the issues
came from and how the Court was partially responsible for not approving budgets
expeditiously each school year, requiring principals and district officials to go above and
beyond to get access to SoE monies. Continuing from L(1468)87,
The SoE program is one of several programs designed, approved and budgeted for
NIS. The intent of the program is the provision of unique educational
opportunities for students who do not want to or are not able to attend integrated
schools. The program is to provide resources for local school staffs to design and
implement focused enrichment activities which meet the needs of their students
…The total approved budget for this program has been cut in half during the fouryear implementation period…A variety of financial constraints have hindered the
program. Much of the funding approved for Schools of Emphasis did not reach
the schools. Budget freezes, late authorization to spend, and confusion over
which expenditures are allowable have resulted in under spending and
considerable frustration on the part of schools staffs (p.3)…Perhaps the most
disconcerting aspect of this confusion about the types of expenditures which local
schools may make in conjunction with their SoE program is the effect on staff
morale...more pervasive, however, is an attitude that little effort toward planning
for the SOE or expanding its impact should be committed because of the
perceived uncertainty over the program's future (p.44)…Recommendation: The
District Court should do all within its power to rule on desegregation budgets as
promptly as possible. (p. 56) 300

The CQE recognized how difficult and demoralizing it was at the school level for
staff to implement a program without having certainty from year to year about major
issues such as if the budget was going to remain in place or what would be approved as
an expenditure. These negative factors contributed to the chronic under-spending of SoE
monies and eventual discontinuation of this NIS program.
After School/Saturday School
Another program serving students in the elementary and middle NIS was the
After School/Saturday School program. It was part of the B-Component provisions of
300
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the Settlement Agreement, meaning it was exclusively part of the remedy for the NIS.
Yet the CQE found the implementation of this program to be extremely lacking as
evidenced by their report L(1987)88. The CQE wrote,
The AS/SS program is not primarily remedial in nature, and it falls far short of
serving all students in NIS who need or want additional instructional
opportunities. Furthermore, the current implementation design is
counterproductive. While the programs as currently offered has some strengths
that should be retained, it suffers from the same difficulties experienced by other
B components: lack of district commitment, insufficient resources, understaffing,
and a reluctance to comply with the spirit of the Settlement Agreement which
requires that students in NIS be provided compensatory educational opportunities
(p.2)…The Committee on Quality Education finds the similarities in
implementation difficulties between these programs and other B components of
the Settlement Agreement to be particularly disconcerting. A lack of planning
and supervision as well as unclear program objectives seem to consistently plague
the B provisions of the Settlement Agreement for NIS. The recommendations
offered by the Committee and provided at the beginning of this report require
commitment and appropriate planning for full and effective program
implementation. (p.48)301
Again, here was a NIS program that was supposed to provide significant remedy
to students, yet, at the building level, relief was not felt. Schools had trouble
implementing this program with fidelity year after year with budgets always in jeopardy,
not released in a timely manner to building principals, or with expenses not being
approved until late in the school year.
High School Remediation
The district, Court, and various committees struggled with how enrichment
programs should look at the high school level. The CQE reported, “We find these
academic achievement levels at the non-integrated high schools particularly alarming.”302
They were originally called Enrichment and Extended Learning Labs in the 1980-1981
301
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school year and by the 1984-1985 school year they became known as Remedial
Centers.303 From the CQE report L(1469)87, “Originally designed to provide enrichment
experiences, the district determined that remedial needs were urgent enough to warrant a
redesign of these labs, and the Court approved such a redesign.”304 These centers
struggled to perform and were recommended for elimination in the Desegregation
Program Review, yet they were preserved under the premise that they would need to be
seriously revamped to provide a better service for 9th grade students in need of
remediation.305 The Court in L(3113)90 also expressed concerns about the Remedial
Center services provided to students.
As a reboot to this struggling program, the superintendent and the Curriculum
Office of SLPS proposed computer-aided instruction, and in January 1991, the Division
of State and Federal Programs began teaching this new skill. 306 While this program
came with promises of being tested and validated, a research review conducted by the
SLPS Division of Evaluation and Research did not find such claims validated. 307
During the evaluation of this new program over a period of five visits, two of the
four non-integrated high schools did not have computers, and in the two schools with
computers, the math component was not administered at all and the reading/language
component was implemented with problems. 308 Because of renovations, Beaumont was
located at McKinley for a period of time and wouldn’t return to its home location until
the 1993-94 school year: three years after the program began.
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There were many physical problems that contributed to the challenges associated
with getting this program running. Mr. M. James Kedro noted in his Evaluation,
Evaluators noted classroom physical problems to accommodate computers. For
example, NCCISF teacher reported that the wiring at Sumner was not adequate
for initial computer installation. At Northwest [then a NIS], an initial lack of air
conditioning in the lab contributed to computer malfunctions. At Vashon, a
phone line could not be installed in the lab for contacting New Century to rectify
computer complications…At the end of the 1991-1992 school year, Northwest
closed as a high school; its NCCISF lab was moved to the Beaumont site, where it
will be stored for a year while Beaumont continues to be renovated.”309
When assessing how many students this program was able to impact, the picture
is no less grim. Across all four NIHS (both with and without computers), 387 students
were enrolled at the start of the NCCISF classes, yet only 215 (54%) finished the second
semester.310 While the NCCISF was able to cut one teacher and one aide due to the
computer-aided instruction, the centers came with a $102,000 installation price tag.311
While money was spent on high school remedial programs, both the CQE and the
SLPS Division of Evaluation and Research showed that the money was not making a
statistically significant improvement for the students the funds were designed to serve.
From CQE Report L(1469)87, “The Committee on Quality Education has expressed to
the Court its sincere belief that under spending and unimplementiation of desegregation
provisions cannot be tolerated if the remedy is to be achieved. The obvious need to
provide additional instructional time and remedial services to students in non-integrated
schools is undeniable.”312
In 1989, even Superintendent Jerome Jones knew the remedial programs were not
working, and in a memo to the BoE, he admitted, "Recent evaluations of the secondary
309
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remedial reading and mathematics centers showed that they are failing to meet the needs
for which they were intended."313
Magnet versus NI School Funding Levels
A stark reminder of the gross inequity in the implementation of the Court’s orders
over the period from 1975-2009 is the difference in funding amounts for magnet and nonintegrated schools. While this subject deserves a much deeper analysis, for the purposes
of this dissertation only one example is highlighted. Documents with specific schoollevel budgets, while found during this author’s data collection, deserve much more
attention than can be paid in this dissertation and have been omitted from this document.
An artifact that deserves attention are the minutes from a Desegregation Task
Force Meeting held on March 24, 1994 during a time of mounting pressure to return local
control to the district and remove state funding. The information reports “desegregation
appropriations for 1993-1994 are $58,485,587 for the 25 magnet schools, $6,306,907 for
the 25 non-magnet integrated schools, and $19,999,481 for the 47 non-integrated
schools.”314 This contrast starkly shows without a doubt where the bulk of the state funds
were going within the district. It is no wonder that the NIS were not able to improve the
conditions of their students when such a large proportion of money was not, in fact, going
to help tem but rather going to help ensure that the magnet schools were the best
environments for learning in the metro St. Louis area.
Black Students’ Destiny Tied to that of White Students
From the start of the 1975 Consent Decree, the plaintiffs raised justified concerns
that magnet schools were not enough of a solution for the large number of Black children
313
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who were experiencing harm from the segregated school system of SLPS. Those early
concerns have been documented in a previous chapter and won’t be repeated here.
However, as time passed and the court monitoring of the 1980 Intracity Agreement got
underway, other entities besides the NAACP and the plaintiff organizers began to
highlight the same inequities raised in the mid-1970s. From a letter to Judge Hungate
from DMAC on November 16, 1981,
We remain concerned, as last year, about the great number of Black students who,
due to their race, federal funding regulations and increasing budgetary constraints,
are not able to attend magnet schools. (p. 2)315
The letter continues,
The Board has explained to the Committee this policy gives county students an
incentive to enroll in magnet schools and provides the Board with a means for
increasing the actual number of white students in the system. The more white
students enrolled in the system, the Board has reasoned, the greater the
opportunity for black students to attend schools in an integrated setting. (p. 29) 316
It was clear to the committee the burden that remained on Black students who
were not able to gain entry into a magnet school. The fate of Black children rested on
decisions of white children, primarily those from the county, who were being expected to
leave their intended county school for a magnet school in the city school system their
parents were trying to escape in the first place. The tying together of the educational
opportunities for Black city children with white county children was an incredibly unfair
and unjust outcome and one of the major flaws of the Settlement Agreements.
Creating elite schools, the magnets, that had specialized curriculum, extra
teaching staff, well-developed themes, and then setting ratios on how many Black and
white children could attend when the district itself was 70-75% Black was an extremely
315
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short-sighted decision by the Court. For the Black children who remained in NIS, while
there was relief in the form of the B-Components of the Settlement Plan that relief has
been shown to fall far short of helping their schools become highly functioning and
effective.
From the same report to Judge Hungate, in the fall of 1981, seven of seventeen
magnet schools were below their target enrollments, with 6,721 Black and 715 white
students on waiting lists.317 This racial discrepancy continued throughout the next two
decades as the district continued in its struggle to attract white students into the magnet
system, particularly those in the county who were a primary target of the Court’s efforts.
While Black students could elect to transfer to county schools and did in large numbers,
which was not the situation all Black families wanted for their children.
Deficit Mindset Festers in NIS
Upon reading the data, it is clear that NIS were not held to the same standards as
the magnet schools and in the first half of the Settlement, the CQE highlights this fact for
the Court on many occasions. From CQE Report L(1469)87,
An analysis of achievement test data for students attending non-integrated schools
reveals that a significant number of students score below national norm in one or
more of the subjects tested. Students attending NI HS score alarmingly low on
these tests.... The CQE concludes that the current level of service delivery falls far
short of the measurable academic need of students attending NIS (p.2)…Given
the fact that the number of students in such settings [NIS] is much higher than
anticipated, and that the level of implementation is somewhat less than originally
contemplated by the Settlement Agreement and accompanying budgets, we
believe it is important to candidly discuss the services being provided to these
students (p.4)…While the numbers have decreased each year, there are still
24,000 black city students attending all-black schools (p.7)…Compensatory and
remedial programs for all-black schools were built into the desegregation plan for
St. Louis as a means of ensuring that students attending these schools were
provided substantive relief from the abiding inequities of racial discrimination.
317
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Evidence entered by plaintiff counsel demonstrated that these schools did not
receive the resources or administrative attention due to them as part of the SLPS
system. The intervention of the federal courts was intended to enjoin
discrimination and to assure just compensation for past wrongdoing (p.8)…The
committee is concerned, however, that a scaling down of these programs will
result in significant areas of need going unmet. As the legal battles rage on, and
budget freezes plague the prospects for successful desegregation of the SLPS, our
concerns are with the students who have a right to relief and are not receiving it.
(p. 9) 318
The CQE highlights the 24,000 students in NIS who qualified for relief but who
were not receiving that relief while also pushing back against a State constantly trying to
reduce funding for the remedial programs.
In the CQE Research Agenda, L(1988)88, the committee explained, “In nearly
every respect, the non-integrated schools (NIS) fall short of providing equal educational
opportunity for the 22,000 students who attend them (p. 2)…An analysis of the above
cited precedents would lead to the reasonable conclusion that the compensatory and
remedial programs and services constitute a cornerstone component of the Settlement
Agreement (p 7).”319 In plain language, the CQE is highlighting for the Court the gross
inequity after the first decade of implementation of the Settlements.
The CQE consistently highlights the deficits the NIS were suffering from, yet the
situation did not improve for the NIS. Six months after the CQE released its research
agenda quoted above, they released a response to the revised Settlement Plan L(2031)88
about the B-Components for NIS. From the CQE Response L(2065)88,
It is a tragic irony that this goal of improvement in non-integrated schools, which
affects the largest number of plaintiff class students, has been the most delayed in
implementation (p. 12)…At the close of five years of Settlement Agreement
implementation, non-integrated schools are without the significant improvements
promised by parties to this case (p. 26)…The Board spent only 58% of their
budget for [student/teacher] ratio reductions in the 1987-1988 fiscal year.
318
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Committee on Quality Education, CQ Report L(1469)87 on Assessment of Remedial Services at NIS, June 3, 1987.
Committee on Quality Education, L(1988) CQE Research Agenda, June 8, 1988.
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Although 26 teachers were required and budgeted, only 10 positions were filled
(p. 27)…CQE has found fault with the Board's budget proposals and
implementation designs, believing them to be unresponsive to the documented
academic needs of students attending non-integrated schools (p. 2)…Through
various reports and responses, the CQE has demonstrated that the academic needs
of students attending non-integrated schools remain to be met through this
desegregation plan (p. 4)...It does, however, graphically demonstrate the slow
pace of implementation and the incomplete implementation of B component
programs and services over the past five years of the Settlement Agreement.
While budget levels proposed for the sixth year for some B components may
facilitate wider service delivery, they still do not promise to serve all students
attending non-integrated schools…In addition, the Court has likened the role of
the Committee to that of a "watchdog" for the interests of students attending allblack schools. (p. 11) 320
The CQE quickly gained a reputation with the Court and other entities involved in
the litigation for noting the gross inequities in the NIS and the ineffectiveness of the NIS
remedies for the plaintiff children. The CQE was caustic in naming the inequity of the
relief offered to NIS while putting this criticism permanently in the legal record in the
form of reports to the Court, status updates, and research agendas, to name a few types of
documents filed. Unfortunately, this outspokenness led the Court to dissolve the
committee, paving the way for a new entity to monitor implementation and “success” of
the programs for NIS.
NIS remedies consistently shown to not work
After the Court dissolved the CQE, Education Monitoring Advisory Committee
(EMAC) took over the role of watchdog for implementation of policy in the NIS. As the
case continued into the 1990s, the Court was receiving increasing amounts of
performance data about NIS. Included in reports to the Court, attendance and
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Committee on Quality Education, L(2065)88 CQE response to proposed 88/89 settlement Plan L(2031)88 Status of
B Components for NIS, July 22, 1988.
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achievement data continued to demonstrate that the NIS were not performing at the level
the Court expected. From EMAC Response G(1053)94,
Generally, reported data indicate no significant improvement in overall
attendance, retention/reclassification and attrition rates for each school
level…more importantly, reported student outcomes suggest the judicial
objectives envisioned in the Liddell remedy are yet to be accomplished (p.1)…
Evaluators note that magnet students' attendance rates consistently exceeded those
for students enrolled in integrated and nonintegrated schools, across school levels,
for the last five years (p. 3)…Moreover, reported data indicated these difference
portend a widening gap in student outcomes between regular and magnet schools
(p.5)…Drop out data in nonintegrated schools ranges from 19.5%, 23.2%, 16.7%
for school year 90/91, 91/92, 92/93 where that data for magnets is 3.1, 5.6 and 4.3
respectively (p. 9, Table 3 High School Dropouts by School Type)…Data
provided in the instant report, as well as previously reported academic
achievement deficits, point to an increasing need to examine and redesign
programs and services to fully realize the judicial goals and objectives envisioned
for students in St. Louis Public Schools (p. 11)…Continued, demonstrated student
outcome deficiencies strongly suggest that the judicial objectives envisioned for
students in the St. Louis Public Schools have not been attained. (p.12)321

These data (attendance, dropout rate, achievement scores) allowed the EMAC to
push back against the State’s attempts to declare that SLPS had reached unitary status.
The data showed that the non-integrated schools were not achieving at a level comparable
to the magnet schools and that more remedy was in order to right the continued wrong of
a segregated school system. The EMAC continued to highlight for the Court the fact that
judicial objectives were still not being met and demanding more remedy for the NIS.
At the start of the 1994-1995 school year, as the State continued to litigate
towards unitary status and release of Court oversight while the EMAC continued to
emphasize that NIS were not meeting judicial objectives. From G(1751)95,
Essentially, students in NI HS have been without an effective
remedial/enrichment program since 1991…Now, six months later, no Board plan
addressing the original goals and objectives of the secondary SoE program has
321

Education Monitoring Advisory Committee, G(1053)94: EMAC response to Board of Education evaluation report
G(1026)94, February 4, 1994.
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been submitted for Court review and approval. In effect, these students will have
been deprived for five years of the availability of an effective compensatory
educational program (p. 4)…The sparse quantifiable data available in Board
reports indicate that historically, implementation of remedial programs/services in
NIS has not positively affected students. Impeding factors have been documented
on numerous occasion; for example, delayed budget decisions, reduced budgets
and staff allocations, ineffective planning, reduction in staff/program development
activities, and ineffective service delivery (p. 6) …The Board contends that the
district is not required to make available AS/S programs to all students in need,
just those eligible students who voluntarily participate, and can walk to the school
or whose parents can provide transportation...Clarification regarding this matter is
necessary, as the 1983 Settlement Agreement at 42-44 states that all students in
need are to be provided remedial programs/services. No data are presented
indicating how remedial needs for other students are addressed. (p.14) 322
Although critical of how NIS remedies had been implemented, EMAC did
provide recommendations for the Board in report G(1751)95. Paraphrased from this
report are these recommendations:
Recommendation 1: The Court should require the board to redesign the annual
status reports to include cumulative data for related student outcome measures;
Recommendation 2: The Court should require the board to include in annual
status reports how remedial and enrichment needs of students unable to participate in the
AS/S programs are addressed and alleviated;
Recommendation 3: The Court should require the Board to submit within 90 days
a comprehensive evaluation of Counseling and Tutoring Services (CATS) operating at 9
NI MS;
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Education Monitoring Advisory Committee, G(1751)95: EMAC response to Board's annual status
report on restructured remedial programs G(1679)95, September 15, 1995.
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Recommendation 4: The Court should require the Board to submit a
comprehensive plan for immediate implementation of an effective remedial/enrichment
program at the HS level. 323
These specific recommendations reflect EMAC’s desire to help the NIS get on track in
providing relief to the plaintiff children.
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Education Monitoring Advisory Committee, G(1751)95: EMAC response to Board's annual status report on
restructured remedial programs G(1679)95, September 15, 1995.
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Chapter Seven: Interest Convergence and White Supremacy
Schools For White Students
What is most disturbing for this author is how a lawsuit that initially was about
the conditions of segregated schools for Black children was hijacked and turned into a
mandate to create highly special and elite magnet schools with the sole purpose of
attracting white county students, in addition to white city students, into the public school
system so that some schools could have integrated populations of students. This
hijacking is the main example of how the hand of white supremacy is ever-present in
policy making. Unless the people making and enforcing policy are cognizant of the
impact and influence of white supremacy society, they will continue to follow the same
bass drum beat of the racist ways of the past. Policymakers took the victim, Black
children, and flipped the story, instead making it about white children and attracting them
back into the city school system for the sake of integrated education. The story should
have remained about working to improve the conditions of the schools Black students
were attending.
Description of the Major Magnet Themes
As a component of all three major pieces of desegregation litigation in St. Louis
(1975 Consent Decree, 1980 Intracity Settlement Agreement and 1983 Interdistrict
Settlement Agreement), magnet schools were a defining feature of the efforts to integrate
the public schools by attracting white students (either city or county) back into the public
school system of SLPS. As plans for the magnet schools became more formalized,
several themes developed and were implemented by the early 1990s. These themes were
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visual and performing arts; math/science/technology; ROTC; and to a lesser extent,
classical/gifted and foreign language.
In a 1988 order, Judge Limbaugh approved a comprehensive Long-Range Magnet
School Plan, L(2090)88, which established specific goals for the magnet program in an
effort to better organize the choices available to parents and streamline the expectations
of the BoE around magnet school enrollment. These measures of success were a)
enrollment of approximately 14,000 students in magnet schools; b) necessary resources
for effective program implementation; c) a high quality educational program consistent
with magnet themes; d) stable racial balance in each magnet school; and e) a total
enrollment in all magnets of at least 1,640 white county students.324
The Court was very specific in the requirements for recruiting county white
students, yet the district was never able to reach those goals. In the late 1980s the Court
established, “By Court Order, county whites must be 40 percent of all whites in
interdistrict magnet schools.”325 County white students remained an elusive
demographic, and while seats were reserved for these students who never matriculated
into the SLPS system, thousands of Black children were kept out of the magnet schools in
an effort to maintain the racial ratios set by the Court.
According to a Recruitment and Counseling Reference Manual, the major magnet
themes and number of schools in each cluster in 1993 were gifted education (two
schools), early childhood education (two schools), military (two schools), international
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Order of the Court, L(2090)88 Comprehensive Long-Range Magnet Plan, August 1988.
Magnet Review Panel, Long-Range Comprehensive Plan for the Magnet Schools of St. Louis Missouri, September
14, 1987.
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studies (three schools), visual and performing arts (four schools), general academic
(seven schools), and math-science technology (three schools).326
Location of the Magnets
As mentioned previously, the location of new magnet schools was exceptionally
contentious because policymakers knew that locating magnet schools in all-Black
neighborhoods would not work to recruit or retain white students. This concern bubbled
up from the first attempts of the district to operate magnet schools in the late 1970s.

326

Chester A. Edmonds, St. Louis Public Schools Recruitment and Counseling Center Reference Manual, Revised
October, 1993.
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In the Elementary and Middle Magnet School Location Study by the SLPS Planning
Division and submitted to the Court on March 20, 1984, one can clearly see that the south
side of the city had more magnet programs than the north.327

Figure 2. St. Louis Public Schools Planning Division, Elementary and Middle Magnet
School Location Study, March 20, 1984, 6.

327

SLPS Planning Division, Elementary and Middle Magnet School Location Study, March 20, 1984.
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In this study, the Planning Division was transparent about the need to add programs on
the north side of the city, however, actuality turned out quite different than what was
proposed.

Figure 3. St. Louis Public Schools Planning Division, Elementary and Middle Magnet
School Location Study, March 20, 1984, 14.
The Real Estate Market and Marketing of the Magnets
As early as 1978, the local real estate publication, St. Louis Realtor, knew that the
magnet schools were going to play a role in marketing city living to prospective white
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homeowners in the city. This marketing helped build the reputation of the magnet school
system as a group of elite, specialized schools that offered something more than the
traditional school. By directly reaching out to the relators of the city, SLPS solidified the
brand of the magnets as elite schools that could be used to convince white families of the
great benefits of living in the city. From a 1978 article in The St. Louis Realtor,
Realtors will find it easy to talk up the advantages of the Magnet Schools. Like
any other excellent products, they help sell themselves. As part of the St. Louis
Public Schools, the magnet schools offer specialized education in a number of
areas, as well as a strong basic education…Choice is the key factor. When
parents and students choose the type of school they desire, children want to learn,
the satisfaction is reflected in better grades and better attitudes about school. 328
Another propaganda document created for a Realtor Convention in April of 1992
was developed by the Recruitment and Counseling Center under the direction of Chester
A. Edmonds. This document was again aimed at realtors working with new-to-the-city
families who would possibly be making their decision to purchase a home around what
schools were available. It contained explanations of how students were assigned to
neighborhood schools, the division of schools by type and grade levels, and a brief
history of desegregation in SLPS, specifically discussing the Intracity Plan of 1980 and
the Interdistrict Plan of 1983. It also highlighted some of the Quality Education
provisions included the Summer Educational Experiences (SEE) and the Schools of
Emphasis (SoE). Lastly, this document contained information about how the magnet
lottery process worked.329
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St. Louis Realtor, “Magnet Schools Help Sell City Living,” February 1978.
Chester A. Edmonds, Gateway to the St. Louis Public Schools, April 16, 1992.
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Recruitment of City and County Whites
Throughout the implementation of the Consent Decree, 1980 and 1983
Settlements and various follow-up Court orders, SLPS struggled to attract white county
students in large numbers, which is not surprising given that most of those families left
the city system and relocated to the county to gain access to a majority-white school
district. However, that reason did not stop the Court and various committees from
continuing to try to recruit white students back to the city. In the first year of the countycity transfer of white children, although 553 county whites were expected to show up on
day one of school, only 300 county students matriculated at the start of the school year
1983-1984 according to an interoffice Memorandum from Campbell to Superintendent
Jones. 330 Convincing white suburban families that their children would be better served in
the city school system was a hard sell.
Various committees were specific in naming their efforts to recruit the elusive
county white student back to the district. For example, the U.S. District Court Order
L(1478)87 on June 9, 1987 stated:
They [responding committees and BoE] all accept BRC chairperson’s
recommended budget however, they wish to include the following items…They
believe these items are necessary to the magnet program and aid in attracting
white county students.331
Some committees were cognizant of how elitist they were being in these special efforts to
attract white students. DMAC was one committee to highlight this elitism:
With the approval of the interdistrict portion of the overall remedy, magnet
schools took on another purpose: functionally, they are intended primarily to
increase possibilities for integration by drawing white students into the system—
from majority white county district (with transportation provided) or from private
330
331

Glen Campbell, Memorandum to Dr. Jerome Jones RE: County to City Interdistrict Transfers, September 9, 1983.
U.S. District Court of Eastern MO, Response of the Court [L(1478)87] to Order L(1450)87 and Responses
L(1464)87, L(1465)87, L(1466)87 and L(1467)87, June 9, 1987.
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schools.... Efforts to attract white students outside the City's public schools to city
magnets generally have not resulted in the response envisioned by the Settlement
Agreement (p. 23-24)...The appropriation of special resources to these schools
and the process of self-selection has resulted, when weighed against the long
delay in delivery of programs to NIS, in an image—if not a fact –of elitism and
unequal opportunity. (p. 24) 332
It seems clear that all the parties recognized that what was happening was unfair to the
students in the NIS, yet year after year budgets continued to grow for magnet schools as
did waiting lists of Black students. Meanwhile, NIS conditions failed to improve.
By the mid-1990s, the majority of white secondary students in the city had chosen
and been accepted to a magnet high school, whereas at the elementary level, there were
still waiting lists for white students. According to BoE Reply G(2384)94, "The bulk of
those students unable to be placed were elementary students…the waiting list of white
magnet high school applicants is virtually empty (p.9)…75% of all available city white
secondary students are in magnet schools." (p.10) 333
The Board of Education was facing pressure from the Court to reach the 14,000
magnet school enrollment goals and struggled to adjust the available seats to meet
demand. Elementary school seats were in much higher demand than high schools;
however, more seats were available at the high school level partially because the schools
were designed to hold many more students. Secondly, high schools were not as
successful at recruiting students, maybe due to fears of violence or higher competition
from private/parochial schools.

332

Desegregation Monitoring Advisory Committee, Second report to court on judicial objectives and court ordered
programs, L(2262)89, January 9, 1989.
333
Board of Education, G(1284)94 BoE Reply to EMAC Plan G(1242)94, July 20, 1994.
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White Fear in Enrollment Changes
As early as the 1980 Settlement, policy appeared to be made due to the fear of
further white flight from the city, obviously influencing decisions that were not in the
best interests of the plaintiffs. The St. Louis Argus reported, “[NAACP National General
Counsel Thomas I.] Atkins said that the fear of ‘white flight’ allegedly caused the weak
plan. ‘We don’t agree with a plan which is based on the fears of white folks who may
leave the city…what we want is a plan which would include the maximum feasible
amount of desegregation.’”334 Through Atkins, the African American community was
voicing its displeasure with the direction of the new Settlement and the excessive
pandering to white families in the “remedies” presented.
The fear of changes impacting white enrollment ran throughout the
implementation of the Liddell decision, appearing again in L(1673)87, the city’s response
to the Magnet School Report. The Magnet School Report, L(1585)87 outlined the
continuation of the three distinct subject categories of magnets in the city system
(international studies, math/science/technology, and visual and performing arts), the
continuation of the gifted and military magnets (which were newer additions), and the
continuation of the sibling priority, and it expressed support for the unified funding
formula for all magnet schools.335
The City of St. Louis, however, responding in legal brief L(1673)87, wanted to
raise the number of seats for Black students because of how white seats were
underutilized, but the City inserts into the report the recurring fear that any change in the
ratios might be unfavorable to the white audience the schools were trying to attract:

334
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Veronica L. Banks, “NAACP To Appeal Desegregation Plan”, St. Louis Argus, July 10, 1980, 1.
L(1585)87 Magnet School Report.
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“Such an increase should only be done slowly and incrementally with active monitoring
of the impact on white enrollment” (p.11). 336 This fear about ratio-reporting to the Court
was constant throughout the litigation, and any time discussions about shifting the ratio
occurred, white fear served to shift the conversation from remedying harms to the African
American community to ensuring that white people in the city continued to choose
magnet schools for an integrated educational experience for their children.
Capital Improvement Priorities
A 1985 report, commissioned by Harvard University’s Graduate School of
Education, analyzes the first-year effects of the voluntary desegregation program. One
opinion is this, “Despite high marks given to most magnet school teachers, suburban
white parents and students were quite critical of the condition of the physical plants in
which magnet schools were housed. They spoke of peeling paint, falling plaster, poorly
maintained restrooms, and inadequate cafeteria services.”337 County white students
coming to the city were attending schools with conditions with which city students were
all too familiar, yet the physical building conditions were the main reason citied for why
county students left the city. City white students who attended the magnet schools
expressed similar concerns:, “While white magnet students and parents believe that their
schools are better, physically, many are in need of repair. Also, better maintenance
would help improve them as learning environments. Parents and students [white]

336

City of St. Louis, L(1673)87 City of St. Louis Response to Magnet School Report L(1585)87, November 3, 1987:
11.
337
Charles V. Willie and Michael K. Grady. Desegregating Schools in the St. Louis Metropolitan Area: An analysis of
first-year effects of a voluntary interdistrict transfer program, February 1985, Graduate School of Education,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
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commented on the need for laboratory equipment, paint, plaster, general cleanliness,
additional text books, and more.”338
The Court had to deal with the physical infrastructure of the district if it was to
build a system of schools that white families would choose to attend. Again, we see the
flipping of policy to appease the white audience rather than addressing the concerns of
the African American plaintiffs who had won the Settlements. The schools did not
receive widespread structural upgrades as a matter of the normal course of action in the
district and the city continued to struggle in gaining support to pass bonds and raise tax
levies. When white families were asked and specifically outlined for the Court the
deplorable physical conditions of the schools, using that as a reason not to attend city
schools, we see another example of interest convergence in improving the school
conditions in the years to come.
The Major Magnet Projects
The need to significantly improve the infrastructure of the magnet schools was
also reported in the Magnet Review Panel’s Long-Range Comprehensive Plan for the
Magnet Schools of St. Louis, Missouri. This panel of outside experts drew information
from the Capital Order L(1570)87 to provide cost estimates for the improvement of
twelve current magnets (with twelve other existing magnet schools not needing
renovation) and the construction of three new magnets. Their estimate was $55,723,415
for the capital costs of the new Magnet Plan, and $30,282,653 for the anticipated cost for
the long-range magnet plan. 339
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Magnet Review Panel, Long-Range Comprehensive Plan for the Magnet Schools of St. Louis, Missouri, September
14, 1987.
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The Capital Improvement Plan further ruled on by Judge Limbaugh in August of
1988 contained specific provisions for magnet-school construction that were highlighted
in a news release from SLPS in December indicating which buildings were going to
experience construction work first. The press release stated,
Contracts totaling $380,875 for development of architectural designs and
construction documents for five magnet school renovation projects were approved
this week by the St. Louis BoE. The contracts are the first construction-related
agreements in a federal court-ordered four-year plan to revamp the magnet school
system of SLPS…The court order [from Limbaugh in August] authorized
spending a total of $51.5 million, of which 71.5% would be provide by the state,
in the Magnet Capital Improvements Plans. The plan supplements an earlier
order to spend $114.7 million on general repairs and updating of St. Louis
schools.340
As noted above, in the first-year desegregation report from Harvard’s School of
Education in 1985, white county students criticized the magnet schools for not being in
conditions comparable to county schools and in need of serious repair, which explains
why these schools received so much attention in the form of an additional $85.7 million.
This was a huge moment of interest convergence on the part of the Court towards the
expectations of white county families who were being courted to attend the city’s magnet
schools.
The Asbestos Issue
As the SLPS district provided cost estimates and building reports to the Court and
the Budget Review Committee, one piece that had to be included in the renovation
projects was asbestos abatement, which was required in all public facilities as a result of
federal litigation in the late 1980s. These additional construction costs were to be borne
by the State as part of the Capital Improvements Plan L(1570)87, but as to be expected,
340
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the State did not agree that they should be responsible for these additional renovation
costs. The State filed L(2505)89 claiming it did not have the responsibility of paying for
the asbestos abatement in the Capital Improvements Plan.341
The Board of Education immediately filed a reply: “Asbestos abatement costs are
clearly desegregation related, and are a necessary component of the Board's system-wide
capital improvements program. The Eighth Circuit to date has not ruled that asbestos
removal costs are not desegregation related”.342
The Court did find asbestos abatement part of the necessary improvements to the
district’s buildings, and this item began to show up in the BoE Reports to the Court about
the Capital Improvement Program (CIP). For example, BoE Report G(683)93 covering
the period from October 1, 1992 through December 31, 1992 showed that $217,372 had
been awarded in that quarter, that $21,730,912 had been awarded since the CIP began,
and that $15,984,344 remained as projected costs of asbestos abatement.343 Asbestos
removal was a necessary expense to bring the schools into compliance with new federal
regulations. The state was eventually held responsible for this expense.
City Obstruction of Construction
One of the schools identified for conversion to a magnet school was Busch School
in south St. Louis, in the Holly Hills neighborhood. The city Board of Public Service
“voted to Deny Approval by reason of the fact that use would be detrimental to the public
health, safety and morals or general welfare and that the use would cause serious injury to
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the neighboring property values.”344 The response was likely due to the Board facing
pressure from white homeowners in the area around Busch School who did not want
Black students to be bused into their lily-white neighborhood to attend an integrated
school.
Judge Limbaugh was exasperated at city officials, and Tim Bryant from the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch wrote that Limbaugh’s Court Order, “accused them of manipulating
zoning and building ordinances to ‘impede the progress being made’ in school
desegregation.345 The St. Louis Post-Dispatch article continues, “As evidence of the
Federal Court’s power in the desegregation case, Limbaugh’s second order said that no
conditional use permits would be required for school construction linked to the
desegregation plan.”346
Judge Limbaugh’s frustration with both the City and the BoE in delaying the
Capital Improvements Plan is obvious. As a result, he stated in Order L(2469)89,
The equitable power of this Court will not be limited by any city agency or
entity…What is necessary is for all parties and local officials to understand that
federal court orders will be carried out as intended. The renovation and
rehabilitation found to be necessary by this Court and by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, for the safety, health and educational needs of
all students in the St. Louis city public schools, will be accomplished without any
interference.347
Judge Limbaugh would not accept any delays of this nature around any part of the
Capital Improvements Plan.
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Board Members, Elections, Policy Making
Anti-Desegregation Faction
In the late 1980s, a contingent on the elected school board was opposed to
carrying out the desegregation orders of the Court and specifically of Judge Limbaugh.
This group of five members were named by fellow board member Rev. Earl E. Nance “a
disruptive element.”348 Board Member Thomas S. Bugel, identified as the leader of the
faction, was opposed to the move of a magnet school into the Holly Hills neighborhood.
What is significant about his position is that the Holly Hills neighborhood is in deep
south St. Louis City and is a majority-white neighborhood. Introducing a magnet school
into this area would bring African American students into this majority-white area, which
the Holly Hills Homeowners Association vehemently opposed.349
The St. Louis Argus staff identified this disruptive element and printed opposition
to them in an editorial published on September 22, 1988: “According to the Riverfront
Times, three of the four individuals elected last November belonged to a group that
carries the banner for white rights, the Metro South Citizens Council…the Council
vehemently opposed school desegregation and supports other conservative causes.”350
Rev. Nance Jr. and the others on the All-City Public School team opposing the Metro
South Citizens Council used the Black press to highlight their new candidacy and to
expose the opposition (the existing board members) for their deplorable, obstructionist
tactics.
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A month later, in another St. Louis Argus article, this white coalition was named
again in blocking efforts supporting the Capital Improvement Plan. In an article
discussing the renovation plans, their obstruction emerges again: “To further compound
the problem, an all-white south-side anti-tax and anti-busing group appears at every
juncture to prevent not only construction progress but schools’ efforts across the
board.”351
Obstruction of the Court’s Orders
With the severe overcrowding in the NIS, the district struggled to make the 20:1
ratio in all classrooms, as explained in a previous chapter. Additionally, because
members of the Board of Education were not always supportive of the Superintendent’s
suggestions or proposals for change, the mandates of the Court were often delayed or not
implemented in a timely fashion. In the first years following the passage of the Capital
Improvement Order, L(1570)87, it became clear the district was struggling to fulfill court
orders related to construction of new classrooms and relief for students in the NIS.
Eventually, Judge Limbaugh had seen enough delays and excuses put forth by the
BoE to the Court that he issued Order L(2468)89 chastising the Board of Education and
the further delays they were requesting from the court. He wrote, "The Court has reason
to believe that such nonfeasance will continue…It has become apparent to the Court that
implementation of the Capital Improvements and Magnet Plans is seriously in jeopardy
due to the failure of the City Board and its administrators to attend to matters necessary to

351
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carry out Court directives.” 352 He was not going to continue to passively allow this delay
to prevent the remedies intended to the plaintiffs.
Judge Limbaugh went on to explain more specifically, "Considering that the City
Board is already in contempt for failing to make any good faith efforts to meet the 20:1
pupil/teacher ratio last year, a delay until 1991-1992 to building additional classrooms is
not a prudent decision.”353 He received the BoE’s request for additional time but was not
satisfied with the reasons given for the delay: one example of the sort of judicial activism
Judge Limbaugh showed in favor of the plaintiffs and against the BoE.
State Obstructionism
Throughout the entirety of the litigation of Liddell, the State of Missouri (both the
Attorney General and the State Legislature) took an extremely aggressive approach
towards all Court decisions and committee recommendations; the State fought every
decision to the furthest extent of the law. The State did not want to be held accountable
for payment of any desegregation remedy and tried to highlight incompetence from the
BoE at every opportunity.
State Obstruction Starts Early
Because the State was named a constitutional violator alongside the district, the
State was expected to pay significant amounts of money to support the desegregation
efforts in both the 1980 and 1983 Settlements. As early as 1980 at the release of the first
order,
The state cried ‘foul’ to U.S. District Judge James H. Meredith’s order that it must
pay for one-half desegregation for the city schools and filed an appeal this week
to stay the proceedings…the primary areas of concern include: jurisdiction of the
352
353
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court to tell the state what it must do; the inflation of the estimated cost of
transportation, and the lack of involvement by the federal government in sharing
the burden of cost to implement the plan. 354
The State of Missouri was in disbelief that the Court would expect it to pay such
huge reparations for the harm caused by maintaining a segregated school system as long
as it had, and the State was willing to legally challenge the ability of Judge Meredith to
make such an order. Flexing the legal muscle of Attorney General John Ashcroft was a
mechanism the State had used throughout the Liddell proceedings time and time again in
filing responses and briefs challenging the legal rights of the Court to mandate that the
State pay for different parts of the Settlements.
The St. Louis Argus consistently wrote a counter-narrative to this dominant story.
Education reporter Veronica L. Banks brought one such counter-narrative from the SLPS
BoE to the public by directly quoting from the board’s brief criticizing the State’s
response to the 1980 decision: “The state should comply with the provisions in
Meredith’s order and cease and desist from interfering with, impeding and crippling the
implementation of provisions in the order. This position is in direct contradiction with
the professed intention for the State to comply with the law of desegregation.”355 Giving
voice to the board in a public fashion highlighted the gross inequity the State was
propagating with their obstructionist stance and demonstrated that the St. Louis Argus
was firmly on one side of the decision.
In an editorial on the same day, the St. Louis Argus went further, with Donald R.
Thompson naming the racism directly:
Missouri Attorney General John D. Ashcroft seems to rise out of the
desegregation plan approved by the Senior U.S. District Judge James H. Meredith
354
355
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like the Ku Klux Klan rose out of the Reconstruction Era….Although the
desegregation issue is not his business, he still, however, has the right to appeal
the decision, but he should provide an appropriate alternative in that case.
Ashcroft did not provide an alternative, he just began screaming against
desegregation.356

The St. Louis Argus served an important role in naming the racism of the State in
fighting against the Court’s order, not just in the appeal itself, but also specifically
highlighting the appeal contained no alternative mechanism to eliminate the segregated
school system. This obstructionism continued throughout the duration of the Liddell
litigation and included delay of payments to the Board, refusal to fund in-service training,
and appealing almost every report submitted to the Court by the Board or the Court’s
various committees.
Initial refusal to pay
While Judge Hungate did not permit the obstruction to the 1980 decision, the
State never ceased litigating against its responsibility to pay as one of the constitutional
violators. At the time of the 1983 Settlement, the State was expected to pay a
significantly increased amount of funds to the BoE to support the expansion of the
magnet schools and also programming in the NIS, called the Quality Education Plan. As
expected, Attorney General Ashcroft filled an appeal to these new orders.
From the State brief to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals,
The entire plan is challenged as being beyond the scope of any violation found
and thus violative of the law as determined by Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
BoE and Milliken v. Bradley (p.1)…In addition to being excessively expensive,
the quality education plan is not related to desegregation since the plan seeks to
upgrade the entire St. Louis school system (p. 3)… Thus, there is no violation by
the state which justifies the remedy of paying for one-half the district's costs to
remedy years of bad management practices in neglecting its buildings' repairs
356
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(p.4)…The state should not be responsible for capital construction costs for any
local district (p.5)…The concept of magnet schools to lure county youngsters has
been perverted to allow the City Board to dump the costs of educating its
youngsters onto the State. When viewed in this light, the magnet school costs are
excessive and unrelated to desegregation. State Defendants object to all items
related to the operational costs of magnet schools in the settlement plan (p.
7)…However, in this extraordinary scenario, parties have reached a settlement
forcing a non-consenting party to bear the financial costs (p.14)…We offer our
essential philosophy that education must first emphasize the attaining of
competency in fundamental skills as well as the development of an early
childhood education program. This is particularly true for disadvantaged youth.
The package developed by St. Louis is an uncoordinated, unworkable mishmash
compiled too hastily by the same administrators responsible for the current state
of education in the city school district. (p.15) 357
The State never was able to highlight any gains from the Settlements but consistently and
fervently fought against any further payments.
Overzealous Litigation by the State
The previous examples are a few of the ways the State litigated against every
court order to pay for the Settlements. As time went on, the Court began to grow weary
of the language used by the State. In his response to several state briefs, Judge Limbaugh
told the State their tone was not appropriate:
The Court finds no violation of its directives, and the construction schedule to be
in compliance what both the spirit and intent of this Court's orders…The State is
mistaken in its belief that the Court ordered all renovation work completed at the
NIS before any work began at integrated schools and/or magnets…As a final
note, the Court is disturbed by the caliber of the State's motion. The contents
were essentially a collection of factual inaccuracies, statistical distortions, and
insipid remarks regarding the Court's handling of this case. Contrary to the State's
laments, this Court has never been too busy to attend to any of the continuous
problems emerging daily in this case; nor has this Court ever engaged in the
inappropriate behavior of ‘continued deference to the Board's unsupervised
discretion (p. 2).358
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Judge Limbaugh was not going to allow the State to continue to unabashedly
berate the efforts of the district and committees. He did not mince words in this order or
others during his tenure presiding over the case.
Consistently Delaying Payments
Found in the BoE archives is a letter from SLPS legal counsel Kenneth C.
Broston to the Assistant Attorney General for the State of Missouri dated November 23,
1987. In this letter Mr. Broston states,
The timeliness of State desegregation payments has been troublesome for many
years. The State’s recent payments show a lack of responsibility on the part of the
State to make timely payments and that’s the purpose of this letter. The State’s
payment for November 2, 1987 pursuant to Order L(1654)87 was not timely
made…The wire transfer on the capital improvements fund which we agreed
would be made on November 6, 1987 was in fact not made until November 9,
1987. These are examples of a long history of days of delay in receiving
payments by the State.359
These payments would have been in the range of $10-20 million dollars and were
critical to the daily operation of the district, used to pay contractors or to purchase
supplies for schools as examples. The State Legislature’s delay of these payments put an
additional burden on SLPS to cover whatever expenses might post on their various
accounts. Without the State funds present, the district was threatened with having to
default unnecessarily on payments to third parties.
While the State’s delay in payment is a minor example in the bigger picture of
implementation of such a large desegregation plan, given the State’s history of
obstructionism and combativeness with each legal decision, it was necessary to include to
show how malicious the State could be against the orders of the Court.

359
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Unitary Status Litigation
By the mid-1990s, the State was ready to begin a new fight against paying more
money to the SLPS. The emphasis changed towards declaring that SLPS had reached
unitary status, indicating there was no longer a harm experienced as a result of a
segregated system and justifying the State’s stopping payments. The State, Judge Gunn,
SLPS, EMAC, and other parties had to agree to these terms, which proved exceptionally
difficult, especially given that students in NIS were consistently performing lower than
their peers in the magnet school system.
One way the State chose to attack the issue of chronic underperformance by the
NIS was to attempt to lower the metrics needed to declare that unitary status had been
reached. If the bar could be lowered far enough, the district could meet the expectations,
and a phase-out of payments and Court oversight could begin. From State Response
G(1301)94,
The State continues to urge the Court to accept its argument that academic
achievement improvement as demonstrated by test scores (or, for that matter, the
other measures proposed) is an inappropriate and unlawful standard by which to
attempt to determine whether unitary status has been achieved. At the very least,
before any goals for the Quality Education programs in the nonintegrated schools
are established which may impact on the Court's determination of unitary status,
an evidentiary hearing should be conducted so that all factors relevant to student
achievement can be considered in determining whether the standards chosen by
City Board are appropriate and reasonable under present funding levels. 360
The State wanted to be able to open the legal door to an evidentiary hearing,
which would then allow them to bring forth a multitude of arguments for why the district
was already in unitary status, with the ultimate goal of avoiding the issue of chronic
underperformance by the NIS.

360
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Chapter 8: Now What
In order to stay true to the theoretical frame of critical race theory, this author has
a moral responsibility to propose a radical alternative to the system that has maintained
segregated schools in St. Louis Public Schools. This chapter is an attempt to think
differently about how schools, specifically at the high school level, are organized in
SLPS. In a town that requires an answer to the question, “Where did you go to high
school”, proposing new policy, specifically at the high school level, seems appropriate.
The division that has been outlined in the preceding chapters is not going to dissipate
with more time, the 40 year history of the Liddell litigation has clearly shown us that.
Present-Day Divisions in Quality
In 2016, a very stark division exists in SLPS between the magnet and
comprehensive schools, specifically at the high school level. One only has to look at the
most recent state assessment results to see that the magnet schools do significantly better
than those schools without theme or special admissions requirements. Who can be
surprised by this fact? When schools were created to be extra-special, a step above the
rest, and appealing the standards of white county families, what did policymakers think
would happen after 40 years of this inequity? When African American students were left
behind in overcrowded, non-integrated schools, with budgets that went largely unspent
and less than a fraction of the resources given to the magnet schools, who is surprised
that this division persists despite unitary status being declared almost 20 years ago? The
question now becomes, what will be done with the knowledge that this division exists
and has deep roots in white supremacy? When will the time come to take honest and
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authentic steps towards ensuring equity for all students that live in the city of St. Louis?
When will the systemic racism that permeates this division be addressed and rectified?
Researchers have used the St. Louis Public Schools frequently as a unique case
study in desegregation because of the immense scope of the 1983 Interdistrict Settlement
Agreement and the nature of a city/county voluntary exchange of pupils. One study from
2015 found that “magnet schools in St. Louis are racially segregated (15 of 18 school
have Black student enrollments more than 50%) and are located in poorer Black
neighborhoods (13 of 18 magnets are in communities where the average median Black
family income is below the city’s median Black family income).”361 The district still has
a majority of non-white students; full integration has never been met in the broader public
school landscape of the city.
Neighborhood elementary schools receiving positive press
While the neighborhood high schools struggle to achieve accreditation status,
several neighborhood elementary schools have recently been recognized for earning that
status. Specifically, Oak Hill Elementary (south side of St. Louis), Mann Elementary
(Tower Grove South) and Carver Elementary (Central West End) are three schools
highlighted in a recent St. Louis Post-Dispatch article by Elisa Crouch that stated, “Now,
fully half of St. Louis schools are doing well enough to be considered accredited–if the
state were to accredit individual buildings. But the approach has not been a universal
success. Half of the schools are still below the state’s standard.” 362 These three schools
were the focus of that article, yet no middle or high schools were mentioned because
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none of them have reached the accreditation standards of the state. The district does not
have any high-performing neighborhood schools on the north side; all of the schools
highlighted in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch article are located on the south side of the city.
Another narrative brought forth in the article was the acknowledgement that the
improvements seen at a few neighborhood elementary schools are not replicated at the
corresponding neighborhood high schools. The article also notes that magnet schools are
those most desired by families, a preference that dates back to the inception and founding
principle of magnet schools as elite. Elisa Crouch reports in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch,
The most sought-after schools in St. Louis are its magnet and choice schools —
schools that admit children based on academic and behavior criteria, and have an
area of focus, such as international studies or the arts. Neighborhood schools will
accept any child within their attendance boundaries. By the time children reach
third grade, neighborhood schools have become a default for children who are
multiple grade levels behind. They feed into the three comprehensive high
schools, Roosevelt, Vashon and Sumner, which rank among the least successful
high schools in the state.363
Here the magnet/neighborhood division is apparent; clearly, a tiered system of schools
that have different expectations for children persists even into 2016.
The District recently hosted its first “Neighborhood School Open House” on
Saturday, April 2, 2016 with the expressed intent of showing the community the
wonderful things happening in non-magnet elementary schools. Elisa Crouch reported,
St. Louis Public Schools will hold its largest open house in recent memory on
Saturday in an attempt to recruit more students and showcase the improvements
that have been made in many parts of the district. From 9 a.m. to noon, doors at
33 neighborhood elementary schools will be open for any parent, student, alum or
resident interested in learning about a building’s academics and activities.
Principals will be at each school, as well as teachers and students to welcome
visitors and answer questions. 364
Elisa Crouch, “Once-lagging neighborhood schools now drive improvement at St. Louis Public Schools,” St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, January 24, 2016.
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SLPS realized that in order to combat the deeply perceived contrast between
magnets and neighborhood schools, it must aggressively market the neighborhood
schools and strategically work to repair the damage that caused this divide. A deeply
imbedded notion is that neighborhood schools are somehow ‘beneath’ the magnet schools
in quality; changing this perception will take a concerted effort by the SLPS, one they are
beginning to take steps to address.
What could be done?
Knowing that the neighborhood high schools continue to struggle while success is
being seen at some neighborhood elementary schools, I propose abolishing the
neighborhood high school concept entirely while providing every student in the district
the choice of what high school to attend. Doing so could be a first step in abolishing the
tiered system of education that has been established in SLPS. Some might say this will
dilute the special nature of the magnet program, however, I would argue that the greater
harm is maintaining a dual system where some children are provided more opportunities
than others. The perpetuation of a dual system leads a group of students in the
comprehensive high schools to internalize a message that somehow they are ‘less than’
the magnet school students. This distinction was a large part of the reasoning behind the
impetus for Brown; separate schools are inherently unequal. More study is needed to
measure the depth of the impact of this negative self-perception.
If the district focused on excellence for all K-8th grade schools, regardless of
school type, it could then be free to allow complete choice for all high school students. If
all SLPS eighth graders were expected to apply to and attend a magnet school for high
school, the tiered system would be a step closer to being abolished, and true equity could
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start to enter the educational landscape of St. Louis Public Schools. Starting at the high
school level, this proposal would put an end to the “drop out factory” mentality that
persists at the neighborhood high schools. As long as SLPS continues to allow students
to graduate from high schools that are unaccredited and consistently low-performing, the
lasting legacy of unequal schooling continues.
Of the three existing neighborhood high schools, radical changes have already
been proposed for two of them, Sumner and Vashon High Schools. Superintendent
Adams has acknowledged that little positive growth for those schools has occurred, and
he is showing another way forward, as Elisa Crouch reports in the Post-Dispatch,
In the past two years, about half of St. Louis district schools have shown
significant improvement. But two that remain at the bottom of the pack are
Sumner and Vashon high schools, where more students dropped out last year than
graduated…For several years, Adams has directed much of his focus on St. Louis
Public Schools’ lowest performing schools…Fifteen of those schools showed
improvement last year over 2014 — six did so well they would be considered
fully accredited standing on their own. But those efforts haven’t made much of a
difference at Sumner or Vashon.365
Adams recognizes that something different must be done for the neighborhood
high schools, and my recommendation to his proposal would be a step towards true
equity for the students of St. Louis Public Schools.
In my proposal, the current entrance requirements for the existing magnet and
choice high schools would be honored. For students who do not meet the entrance
criteria for any city high school, the district would pool together and then divide the
students by a proportion to each of the magnet schools based on the size of each school
and preference of the student. That way the children deemed “unacceptable” by the
various magnet school entrance requirements would not continue to be hyper365
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concentrated into the neighborhood high schools. Instead, they would be given a choice
about where to attend and placed into schools in proportions determined by each current
magnet school size. Closing the comprehensive high schools is a necessary first step to
shifting the current policy of concentrating the students who are deemed unacceptable
and instead treating them like the brilliant young people that they are. The chronic
underperformance of comprehensive high schools lends imperative to the need to do
something radically different.
By eliminating all three comprehensive schools, the district would preserve more
resources for additional staff at the remaining magnet and choice schools, i.e. social
workers, nurses, cafeteria staff, and security personnel. Resources could then be
concentrated in all the magnet or choice schools to do a better job of supporting all
students. Ensuring all students full-time access to supports like nurses and social workers
would help the transition and merging of all high school students. Additionally, by
closing three schools, a more robust supportive alternative environment could be
established for students who are removed from school for severe disciplinary infractions
such as drug possession.
The other benefit to this plan is that the program currently in place to support
students that have dropped out could be expanded with the funds freed up by the closing
of three schools. This program, called K12 Credit Recovery, has proven successful in
helping students who struggle with the traditional school model graduate with a diploma.
Whether they are young parents, full time workers, students in this program complete
virtual classes under the supervision of certified teachers. This model could be expanded
to more locations with the surplus funds.
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Lastly, the SLPS have a large population of homeless students. Other districts in
the region, Maplewood Richmond Heights and Jennings School Districts, have district
sponsored housing for some of their homeless student population. SLPS could replicate
these incredible successful programs with the additional funds from the closing of these
three schools. While these two districts have a much smaller population of homeless
students, the model they are using has been successful in supporting the students selected
for participation and support. SLPS could use some of the funds saved by closing the
identified schools to open housing of this type for its neediest and most vulnerable
students.
Conclusions
While I can already hear the principals of magnet schools complaining about how
this proposal will “water down their programs” and potentially allow a “bad” element
into their schools, providing new additional resources for them will help to mitigate their
concerns. Ultimately, every educator purports to believe that any students can achieve.
Allowing all students access to the high schools showing excellence would be a move
towards equity for all. By providing additional support for the magnet high schools, all
students will be given an option to attend a school of their choice, regardless of their
special education status, attendance record, or academic performance. It is time for the
district to take on equity and stop pretending that students attending neighborhood high
schools have access to excellent schools.
I fully acknowledge that closing two of the oldest high schools for African
Americans in St. Louis will be negatively received by a community that has experienced
many school closures and destruction of neighborhoods. By instead repurposing these
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schools, their historical significance can be maintained for the community while
breathing new life into them with existing successful magnet programs. Ultimately SLPS
has too many high schools to operate in a manner that maintains fiduciary responsibility
and all students have a right to access magnet high schools.
By taking an affirmative action approach to high-school placement, the SLPS
would be demonstrating to the region and the country that it truly believes all students
deserve quality schools in both written policy and observed mission. While it would be
an uncomfortable change, fighting for equity has never been neat or pretty. Equity comes
only when those with power and position sacrifice that power and position for those
without similar access. It is time that SLPS recognizes that the system of tiered schooling
set up by years of privileging whites be dismantled by direct action. Anything less than
radical change only maintains the status quo of inequity for the children of St. Louis and
continues to perpetuate the divisions caused by explicit segregation and policy steeped in
white supremacy.
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